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Abstract
My thesis consists of three chapters where I study topics in international financial
economics and bank regulation.
First chapter: European countries were seen increasing their debt positions during
the debt crisis of 2009-2012. This is particularly true for countries whose debt level and
government spending prior to the crisis were high. This observation is rationalized here
by building a simple “default” model. The main feature of this model is that of convex
adjustment costs on government spending which make it such that countries are willing
to finance smoother reductions in spending by borrowing. Some interesting features of
this model are highlighted, including the fact that countries that eventually exit the
crisis by reducing their debt initially borrow to finance a smooth reduction in spending.
Second chapter: In 1989, the IMF altered its long-standing policy on loans to
sovereign nations and began lending to sovereigns who were in arrears, i.e., countries
with past due debt. I document that the fraction of sovereigns falling back into default
after a rescheduling of their debt more than halved after the 1989 policy was intro-
duced. At the same time, write-offs on defaulted debts doubled. Using a model where
the willingness of sovereigns to repay their debts fluctuates, I show that this policy shift
can account for these two facts. It has been maintained by the IMF that this policy
benefited both sovereigns and lenders. My model shows that such a policy shift actually
benefits sovereigns at the expense of lenders.
Third chapter: The goal of this paper is to provide an evaluation of the impact of
changing capital requirements on US banking system. In particular, we study the extent
to which raising capital requirements improves the resiliency of US financial institutions
in the face of a severe financial shock like the 2008 crisis. Improving the resiliency of
these institutions in turn makes the need for another public bailout of the financial
system less likely.
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Chapter 1
Costly Spending Adjustment in
Debt Crises
1.1 Introduction
Our understanding of sovereign debt crises, prior to the European debt crisis, mostly
drew from developing countries such as those of Latin America at different times in
the past thirty years. The study of these episodes provided a number of insights and
important tools to be able to better understand why countries would choose to default,
and predict their behavior during sovereign debt crises. Theories vary, from Kehoe
and Cole (2000) where lenders cause the default by blocking economies out of financial
markets in fear that they will not be able to repay their debt, to Arellano (2008) where
countries choose to default rather than have to make interest payments when their GDP
is sufficiently low. Despite our understanding of sovereign debt crises having improved
so dramatically in the past couple of decades, the European debt crisis questions our
understanding in a number of ways.
The model of self fulfilling debt crises of Kehoe and Cole addressed the Mexican
crisis of 1995 where lenders in fear of potential default stopped lending to Mexico. The
US stepped in and provided funds to Mexico and as a result ended the crisis. Their
model is one of countries borrowing in short term debt, where lenders have to commit to
their lending before being payed back last periods debt. The result of this set up is one
of multiple equilibria where if lenders believe the country will not be able to repay they
1
2stop lending, and if the country has large enough levels of debt, repayment is impossible.
The debt levels such that the country is vulnerable to a run are coined as the crisis zone.
The behavior of the countries in this region is how we interpret countries as being in a
crisis. In the crisis zone there are two types of behavior. There are countries whose debt
level is so large that they choose to remain in the crisis zone rather than go through
painful austerity measures. Further, there are countries that are willing to reduce their
spending and those are the ones that exit the crisis zone assuming a run does not take
place. Kehoe and Cole argue that Mexico belonged to the latter group and the US
prevented the run from having an impact, and as a result Mexico eventually exited the
crisis. This model captures the Mexican story, however when considering the European
debt crisis things were quite different.
European countries were seen increasing their debt positions during the crisis. This
was true even for countries that received financial assistance, such as Greece and Por-
tugal. Kehoe and Conesa (2012) approached this problem in a similar fashion to Kehoe
and Cole with the additional assumption that countries eventually exit the recession
they are in. They argued that European economies, being aware that eventually they
will exit the recession, chose to keep spending more than would have been necessary to
exit the crisis. In fact, they argue, that facing low interest rates, as those offered by
troika, would keep spending so high as to see increases in debt. Their argument implies
that unless countries exit the recession they would end up defaulting. As a result, any
intervention would be a waste of money and in fact induces “deviant” behavior, in their
view.
The exorbitantly high interest rates of 2009-2012 started dissipating in 2013 and
onwards. This was true despite the fact that these countries GDP had not recovered.
In fact in 2012 the European Central Bank (part of troika) announced free unlimited
support to all Eurozone countries that were in trouble . The two facts make “gambling
for redemption” by the European countries seem less plausible.
The theory proposed here (section 2) is based on the premise that countries find it
costly to adjust their spending. When not in a crisis, if a country finds itself with too
high spending borrowing takes place in order to finance the smooth transition of the
spending. When in a crisis the country attempts to do the same, however borrowing is
more expensive, and the benefits of reduction in spending are larger (lower interest rates
3associated with exiting the crisis). Countries with high levels of debt will adjust their
spending in a similar fashion to what they would have done if they were not in crisis
since the benefit of exiting the crisis zone is, correctly, perceived to be distant. On the
other hand countries with lower levels of debt will alter their behavior dramatically, in
some cases choosing to outright decrease their borrowing. Further, there are countries
with high levels of debt and initial spending that start off by increasing their debt to
finance smooth reductions in spending and once spending has decreased enough start
lowering their debt. This non-monotonic relationship is the one argued here to have
characterized the borrowing behavior of most European countries.
The adjustment costs introduced are convex and capture a number of different costs
associated with adjustments in government spending. The first component of costs
are standard labor and capital adjustment costs that have been studied extensively in
the macro literature. The government, however, in contrast to a normal firm has to
consider the costs borne to the whole economy by its actions. As a result other costs
that are borne to the government when adjusting its spending are costs associated with
transferring labor from the public sector to the private sector (e.g. under-utilization of
labor).
The theory built here suggests a very clear relationship between the level of debt
and government spending prior to the crisis and the borrowing behavior during the
crisis. Countries that start with higher levels of debt and government spending should
borrow at a greater rate during the crisis. Countries with lower debt levels but higher
government spending might end up borrowing at levels higher than countries with high
debt and low government spending. These trends are documented in section 1 for the
troubled countries in Europe.
41.2 Empirical motivation
European countries, as is well documented, faced increasing difficulties in servicing their
debt between 2009-2012, with many of them still not having fully recovered. Countries
such as Greece and Portugal due to their difficulties in repaying their loans had to
resort to borrowing from troika, made up from the IMF, European Commission, and
European Central Bank. The objective here will be to investigate the behavior of some
of the troubled economies. More precisely, in the spotlight will be their increase in
borrowing in the midst of the crisis. As will be argued amongst the countries that will
be considered, the ones that borrowed the most during the crisis were the ones whose
debt levels, and government spending were the highest prior to the crisis. Debt itself is
not sufficient in understanding the borrowing behavior since countries that were highly
indebted prior to the crisis but whose pre crisis government spending was low borrowed
less than countries that started off at low debt levels.
Economies defined as troubled here are European countries1 whose spreads (dif-
ference in yields of countries 10 year bonds to US 10 year bond yields) were above
one percent for two consecutive years during 2009-2012. This definition incorporates
all countries that required bailouts2 . Figure 1.1 list the countries that are considered
troubled (in black) and the ones that are not (in blue) further the average spread during
the 2009-2012 period for each group is plotted.
The average spreads of the troubled countries are strictly higher than those of the
not troubled ones (“safe”). The average spreads during the crisis were higher than
pre-crisis levels, and most of these countries saw their spreads jump in 2009-2010.
A pattern that was noted in Kehoe and Conesa was that of increases in borrowing
in the 2009-2012 period of European troubled countries. Figure 1.2 is a plot of the debt
levels of the troubled countries normalized by 2008 GDP that illustrates this point.
In order to investigate the borrowing behavior of these countries in more detail,
the average increase in debt (measured as a fraction of 2008 GDP) for each country
during the crisis years is plotted against debt to GDP in 2009 in figure 1.3. As is clear
from this graph borrowing behavior is quite heterogeneous. Countries that started the
1 Ireland and Cyprus are not included since the banking crisis that they faced was the main moti-
vation for their spending.
2 Greece’s average spread was 11.4 (far larger than the rest)
5Figure 1.1: Average Spreads for 10 year bonds during 2009-2012
crisis with low levels of debt displayed similar behavior in terms of the amount of debt
they accumulated on average. On the other hand, as initial debt increases countries
debt accumulating behavior varied more substantially. The graph suggests that highly
indebted countries can end up increasing their borrowing by more or less than lower
indebted countries.
In order to gain a better understanding as to why these highly indebted countries
behave differently we consider the fiscal position of these countries prior to the crisis.
More precisely, the amount of government spending3 in these countries will be measured
as a fraction of the revenues4 . Figure 1.4 is that of government expenditure as defined
here against debt to GDP in 2009. The approach that will be taken here is that of
separating these countries into three groups as can be seen in figure 1.5. One group
includes the low debt countries, another the low expenditure countries and the last the
countries that have high levels of both aforementioned variables.
3 Government spending will not include social protection, foreign economic aid, or interest rate
payments (components included in the standard definition of Government Expenditure). Examples of
what is included in expenditure are health, education, and defense. The definition used here is aligned
to that of general government final goods consumption.
4 More precisely these will be the revenues once transfers have taken place. That is, from total
revenues we subtract social protection, foreign economic aid.
6Figure 1.2: Debt levels for the troubled economies normalized by 2008 GDP
The experiences of the economies, in terms of both the severity of the recession and
the spreads during the crisis, were similar between groups (on average) as can be seen
in figure 1.65 . The spread reported is the average spread for each country during the
crisis years. To get a simple measure of the severity of the recession, GDP (in constant
local currency) is linearly detrended for the years of 1995-2012 for each country. The
measure used here is the percentage difference of GDP from its linear trend on average
during the crisis.
Having established that between group heterogeneity is low, we now plot the average
increase in debt for each one of these countries, as above, but now against the group
they belong to in figure 1.8. As can be seen it is the countries that had high levels
of debt and at the same time high levels of expenditure before the crisis that ended
up borrowing the most. Interestingly, countries with lower levels of debt were actually
borrowing more during the crisis than countries with much higher levels of debt (for
which interest rate servicing is much larger). It is this observation that the model of
section 2 rationalizes.
5 The Greek spreads are an outlier, however, Greece during this time period was doing its borrowing
solely through troika and as a result it never had to deal with expensive borrowing.
7Figure 1.3: Average increase in debt (normalized by 2008 GDP) for the troubled coun-
tries over debt to GDP in 2009
1.3 The model
No default model
We consider a small open economy with a fixed endowment of a single good yt = y ∀t ∈
T . Time, T , will be discreet, T = {0, 1, 2, ...}. There are three type of agents in
each period, households, international lenders, and the government. Each one will be
described in turn.
Households
There is a continuum with measure one of households that have preferences over gov-
ernment spending and private spending, (gt, ct), that take the following form
∞∑
t=0
βt(ug(gt) + uc(ct))
Each period they receive (1 − τ)y, after tax income. The budget constrain is as
follows
ct = (1− τ)y
8Figure 1.4: Debt to GDP over spending to revenues in 2009
where for simplicity we have abstracted from decisions such as investing, saving or
labor-leisure.
Lenders
There is a continuum with measure one of lenders who have preferences over the con-
sumption good, (xt), that take the following form
∞∑
t=0
βtxt
Each lender receives endowment x¯ each period and chooses how much she wants to
lend to the government. Her budget constraint is,
xt + at = qtat+1 + x¯
and has to satisfy the No Ponzi condition,∃A > 0 such that bt ≤ A for all t ≥ 0, and
non-negativity of consumption.
Lenders are passive. That is, given qt = β they are willing to lend any quantity
and we will assume that x¯ is large enough such that they are never constrained in the
amount they can lend.
9Figure 1.5: Debt to GDP over spending to revenues in 2009 (Groups)
Government
The government is benevolent, and takes the decision of the household as given when
choosing government spending. It has the ability to borrow from international markets
at interest rate r = 1β − 1 . The budget constraint (given the interest rate) is as follows:
ct + gt = bt+1 − (1 + r)bt + y − p(gt − gt−1)
where p(gt − gt−1) is the function that specifies how much of the good is wasted
when transition from gt−1 to gt and is specified as
p(gt − gt−1) = φmax(0, gt−1 − gt)2 φ ≥ 0
where waste only takes place for reductions in spending, i.e. when gt−1 > gt.
The government also faces the standard No Ponzi condition, and non-negativity of
spending.
Some results
The environment is set up such that the governments problem is the only one of interest.
The governments problem can be written as
10
Figure 1.6: Difficulties in borrowing as measured by average, during the crisis, 10 year
bond spreads
max{gt,bt+1}∞t=0
∑∞
t=0 β
tug(gt) s.t.
gt = bt+1 − (1 + r)bt + τy − p(gt − gt−1)
b0, g0 given
gt ≥ 0
No Ponzi
Figure 1.9 is the phase diagram of this problem solved numerically.
The space state space (b, g−) is separated into three regions
H = {(b, g−)|g− > τy − rb}
L = {(b, g−)|g− < τy − rb}
E = {(b, g−)|g− = τy − rb}
If the initial condition is in E the government chooses to stay there since the spending
and the interest rate payments are exactly offset by the tax revenues, and the interest
rate is set exactly equal to the reciprocal of the time preference.
11
Figure 1.7: Severity of the recession during the crisis, as measured by average, during
the crisis, deviation of GDP from trend
Starting at L implies that given the amount of outstanding debt government spend-
ing is low compared to steady state government spending. As a result an increase in
government spending will have to take place. Again the fact that the interest rate is
the inverse of time preferences, and the zero adjustment cost for increasing government
spending imply that the government will choose to increase its government spending
directly to the steady state level, given the level of debt, and remain there.
The region that is of most interest is H. In this region the governments spending is
too high compared to the steady state level. The quadratic adjustment cost associated
with reducing spending makes it such that the government would rather reduce its
spending slowly, and as a result spending is kept at a high level (i.e. in the transition
the government remains in H) implying debt accumulation.
In the model with default the forces that are in play in H, that is the governments in-
centive to avoid wasting resources, will be contrasted to the incentive of the government
to reduced expenditure in order to exit the crisis.
12
Figure 1.8: Average, during the crisis, increase in debt to 2008 GDP for each group
Default model
We now introduce the model which gives rise to a crisis zone. As is apparent from above
the households problem is particularly simple and as a result it will only appear through
the governments problem
Government
The government is given the option to default on its debt. The outside option it faces
if it chooses to do so is
V D(g−, α) = max{gt}∞t=0
∑∞
t=0 β
t(ug(gt) + uc((1− τ)αy) s.t.
gt ≤ ατy − p(gt − gt−1)
g ≥ 0
g−1 = g−
Complete autarky with an output penalty of α ensues. The random variable in the
model will be α which has the following structure. (αt)
∞
t=0 is Markov with two states
0 ≤ α ≤ a¯ ≤ 1. State α¯ is absorbing whereas P (αt+1 = α|αt = α) = λ . In what follows
13
Figure 1.9: Phase diagram
the state, will be suppressed in the notation, for example V D(g−, α¯) = V¯ D(g−).
We restrict attention to Markov perfect equilibria allowing us to write the problem
in its functional form. The governments problem in the case where α¯ realizes, and
default has not taken place, is
V¯ (b, g−) = max{b′,g}ug(g) + uc((1− τ)y) + βmax{V¯ (b′, g), V¯ D(g)} s.t.
g + b = q¯(b′, g)b′ + τy − d(g − g−)
g ≥ 0
The price depends only on the variables the lender perceives as affecting the chances
of default, which coincide with tomorrows state, and the realization of α today since
tomorrows value cannot be perfectly predicted (at least not in the α case).
The problem when α realizes, and default has not taken place, is
14
V (b, g−) = max{b′,g}ug(g) + uc((1− τ)y) + β(λmax{V (b′, g), V D(g)}+
(1− λ)max{V¯ (b′, g), V¯ D(g)) s.t.
g + b = q(b′, g)b′ + τy − d(g − g−)
g ≥ 0
The crisis region emerges due to the fact that when the outside option is bad, α,
higher levels of debt can be sustained without default. If, however, α¯ realizes default
would ensue for such high levels of debt. Therefore, there will be levels of debt, high
enough, such that default occurs with the probability λ. This region will be defined as
the crisis region.
Lenders
Lenders will price the bonds fairly again. Setting up the environment as above, including
the uncertainty of being repayed, we get
q¯(b, g−) = βx¯(b, g−)
q(b, g−) = βλx(b, g−) + β(1− λ)x¯(b, g−)
where x(b, g−, α¯) is one if repayment takes place at state (b, g−, α¯), and zero oth-
erwise, and α is suppressed in the notation as per usual. Notice that x(b, g−, α¯) is an
equilibrium object.
Note that as mentioned above there will be regions in the state space where default
take place in the next period if a¯ realizes, i.e. x¯(b, g−) = 0, and does not take place if
α realizes, i.e. x(b, g−) = 1. This would imply that in that region the price of debt will
beβλ.
Some results
The following results are again from a numerical exercise. A flow similar to the one
above is displayed in figures 1.10 and 1.11 for the crisis region.
In figure 1.10 the partition of the state space into the crisis region, C, and the default
region, D, where irrespectively of the realization of α default takes place, can be seen.
15
Figure 1.10: Eventual exit from C
Any debt level below the crisis region is such that the government prefers to remain in
the financial markets irrespectively of the realization of α.
Also displayed in figure 1.10 are the dynamics that take place at the subset of the
crisis region where eventual exit from the crisis will take place as long as α¯ does not
realize. The government can be seen to be increasing its debt position when starting
with large levels of past government spending and large enough debt. The motive of the
government to increase its debt position is the same as the one in the no default case.
Its optimal path balances the incentive to avoid waste, associated with the quadratic
adjustment cost, and the incentive to exit the crisis. Eventually, government spending
decreases enough to be able to exit the crisis zone.
Another interesting aspect of the dynamics here is the contrast between higher and
lower levels of debt for high levels of past spending. What can be seen is that for low
enough levels of debt the government actually chooses to deleverage. The incentive to
exit the crisis zone here dominates the one to avoid waste. This is due to the fact that
lower levels of debt are associated with lower interest rate payments, and exiting the
crisis region requires less sacrifice, due to the fact that the threshold where the interest
rate decreases is closer.
16
Figure 1.11: Eventual default
Figure 1.11 illustrates the dynamics that take place in the subset of the crisis region
where exit never take place. Governments in this region will converge to a steady
state and eventually default when α¯ realizes (which happens with probability one). It
is particularly interesting that for high levels of past spending governments actually
choose to increase their debt position and lenders are willing to lend to them despite
the fact that they will eventually certainly default.
1.4 Conclusion
A closer look at the data suggested that countries with higher government spending
prior to the crisis were borrowing significantly more during the crisis. This behavior
was shown to arise in a model with adjustment costs to government spending. Further
predictions of this model were highlighted such as eventual exit from the crisis zone in
spite of initial borrowing.
The direction this project is taking currently is that of establishing a continuous
time counterpart. In doing so comparative statics and nuances of the mechanism will
become easier to establish and analyze. Sharpening the predictions of this model could
17
provide further insight into the European crisis.
Chapter 2
Consequences of the
Lending-into-Arrears IMF Policy
Shift
2.1 Introduction
The IMF was set up as an organization, as stated in the language of its founding
document, “To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the
Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards.” One such safeguard
was the IMF policy that prohibited the organization from lending to members whose
debt was in arrears1. In 1989, the IMF altered its long-standing policy on loans to
sovereign nations and began lending to sovereigns who were in arrears.
In this paper, I document that the fraction of sovereigns falling back into default
after a rescheduling of their debt more than halved after the 1989 policy was introduced.
At the same time, write-offs on defaulted debts doubled. Using a model where the
willingness of sovereigns to repay their debts fluctuates, I show that this policy shift
can account for these two facts. It has been maintained by the IMF that this policy
benefited both sovereigns and lenders. In my framework, the policy results in a loss of
bargaining power to the lenders, meaning that this policy shift that actually benefits
1 Arrears are defined as an amount owed that should have been paid at an earlier date.
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sovereigns at the expense of lenders.
I develop a model with a sovereign debtor country and sovereign debt lenders. The
debtor country is in arrears, technically in default, but economic conditions have sta-
bilized, and the debtor would be better off if it could emerge from default. Of course,
lenders demand full repayment of the debt. Given the opportunity, the sovereign would
choose to obtain new loans from the markets, use them to repay its obligations and pay
down the new loans over time. However, when the debts are large, markets are unable
to coordinate to lend additional money2. This creates the opportunity for the IMF to
provide liquidity to the member country.
I model the first form of IMF lending, i.e., “no lending into arrears,” as an IMF
loan conditional on the sovereign fully repaying all arrears and any maturing debt,
using a combination of its own resources and the IMF loan. The second form of IMF
lending, i.e., “lending into arrears,” is modeled as a relaxation of the conditional nature
of the IMF loan. In this case, the sovereign receives the IMF loan conditional on not
accumulating additional arrears, i.e., repaying all maturing debts. In particular, this
program does not mandate repayment of existing arrears. Having taken the IMF loan,
in either policy, the sovereign then spends some time to pay down this loan and regain
access to the bond markets, at which point any remaining arrears are cleared. While
the sovereign is paying down the IMF debt, the cost of being in default may decrease.
If the debt owed to the IMF is large enough, the sovereign defaults3.
In my model, with “no lending into arrears” sovereigns fully repay outstanding
arrears. Not doing so deprives sovereigns of the financial liquidity necessary to emerge
from default. On the other hand, with “lending into arrears”, absent a rescheduling,
sovereigns no longer choose to service the arrears prior to receiving the IMF loan.
Arrears holders prefer to reschedule, and get less money prior to the IMF program
2 In the benchmark model this feature will show up as the markets not being willing to provide any
resources to the sovereign who holds above a critical threshold of debt. In the model extensions I show
how such behavior emerges in a Cole and Kehoe (2000) model of roll over crises
3 IMF debts tend to be fully repaid so the assumption of defaulting on IMF debt may seem like an
odd one. There are two reasons why I make this assumption. First, Beers and Nadeau (2015) collect
data on defaulted debt and show that despite conventional wisdom sovereigns do in occasion default on
the IMF, however it tends to be in small amounts. Second, in my model I make the assumption that
if sovereigns choose to default after the rescheduling has taken place they never reschedule their debts
again and hence remain in default indefinitely. A relaxation of this assumption with seniority given to
IMF debt would match the patterns of default on IMF debt.
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rather than to wait for the duration of the program to get the full face value of their
claims. The reasoning is that outstanding arrears disincentivize the sovereign from
reducing its debt, and thus expose the arrears to default risk for a longer period of
time. Therefore, in my model, full repayment of arrears prior to the 1989 policy is
contrasted to the partial repayment of arrears after the policy of lending into arrears
was implemented. The chance of falling back into default is smaller since sovereigns end
up being less indebted due to the haircut being larger. Therefore, my model rationalizes
the observations of smaller debt servicing difficulties, and larger haircuts, with a sharp
implication being that the sovereigns are better off as a result of the policy at the
expense of the lenders.
My contribution is the study of the IMF policy of lending into arrears in an envi-
ronment where the sovereigns cost of being in default, and hence willingness to repay
its debts, fluctuates. The IMF policy of lending into arrears exposes the sovereigns
outstanding arrears to this risk of non-payment. This results in a de facto loss to the
lenders. Key to my analysis are the underlying incentives that lead to rescheduling of
the arrears. In particular, in the program of lending into arrears, both the lenders and
the sovereign can benefit from a rescheduling. The reasoning is that large sums of ar-
rears disincentivize the sovereign from reducing its debts. This hurts both the sovereign,
who has to roll over its high debts, and the lenders, whose arrears are exposed to risk for
a longer period. Partial reduction of the arrears by the lenders provides the sovereign
the incentives to implement prudent debt reduction policies. Sovereigns can then pass
along part of that benefit to the arrears holders in the form of larger repayments on the
arrears. The data discussed above validate this theory, both in the resulting increase in
haircuts, and in the reduced probability of a repeat default.
Mexico’s 1980’s debt servicing difficulties are an example of the pre-1989 policy.
During the 1970s, Mexico had accumulated a significant number of loans from US banks
anxious to exploit the massive infusion of petrocurrency4. In the 1980s, this ready
capital began drying up and Mexico was stymied in further attempts to borrow. Unable
to meet its obligations, Mexico defaulted in 1982. For the duration of the 1980s, Mexico
went through a series of defaults and reschedulings. Mexico went through a total of six
reschedulings before finally getting a major haircut on the debt under the Brady Plan
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in 1991, which concluded the countrys long, convoluted default saga.
In contrast, Ecuador’s 1999 debt servicing difficulties are a typical post-1989 exam-
ple. In 1995, Ecuador negotiated with lenders under the Brady Plan restructurings,
and achieved a substantial reduction in the face value of its debt. But at the end of
the 1990s, Ecuador faced further macroeconomic difficulties including a banking crisis,
and the country was once again unable to service its debt. In 1999, Ecuador finally
defaulted. Further debt restructuring took place in 2000, after which Ecuador exited
default. It took an additional year and IMF assistance for Ecuador to finally clear the
remaining arrears.
The key difference in these two default episodes, I argue here, was the amount of
debt that lenders wrote off. Mexico, for the duration of the 1980s, was only able to
negotiate very small reductions in the value of its debt, and it was only in 1990 after a
more substantial reduction in debt took place under the Brady Plan, that Mexico finally
emerged from default. Conversely, Ecuadors restructuring terms were significantly more
favorable and less burdensome, and Ecuador has not faced any additional debt servicing
difficulties after its restructuring in 2000.
The paper is structured as follows. In the literature review section I provide a
detailed discussion on how my paper fits in the existing literature and which papers
it draws from. I then discuss the empirical findings in the data section; in particular,
I establish that debt-servicing difficulties have subsided after the lending into arrears
policy was introduced and that haircuts have increased substantially in the same period.
I then introduce the model, and analyze the deleveraging stage and the rescheduling
game. In the last section, I conclude.
2.2 Literature Review
Over two decades have passed since the Latin American crisis ended, and many papers
have been written on this topic. Rogoff and Zettelmeyer (2002) provide a good survey of
the literature, discussing a number of themes in the development of economic thinking
and its application to IMF policy. An important theme that guided economic thought
4 Petrocurrency were trading surpluses of oil exporting nations during the oil price hikes of the
1970s
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during the crises of the 1980s was that of inefficiencies in debt rescheduling. The idea,
repeated by the IMF in support of the policy of lending into arrears, was that even
when both lenders and sovereigns wanted to reach an agreement on debt rescheduling,
the policy of not lending into arrears may have prolonged the renegotiations.
An early paper in support of this idea is Wells (1993), who argues that the policy
of no lending into arrears delays the rescheduling of arrears. In her model, delays arise
due to asymmetry of information on how eager the sovereign is to reach an agreement.
A sovereign very eager to reach an agreement wants to hide this information. In doing
so, it poses as a less eager sovereign, rejecting offers the lender makes to convince the
sovereign of being less eager to reach an agreement. Her point is that the policy of not
lending into arrears grants lenders the ability to punish the sovereign by stalling IMF
assistance and, as a result, pushing for smaller haircuts. The smaller haircuts exacerbate
the delays, with sovereigns taking longer to accept a rescheduling. Lending into arrears
mitigates this problem. The lenders in the no lending into arrears scenario are able
to extract a larger share of the surplus than in the lending into arrears counterpart.
However, because of the delay in rescheduling, the total surplus is smaller. The sovereign
is irrefutably better off as a result of the policy. However, the effect on the lenders is
unclear since they are now able to capture a bigger piece of a smaller pie. My analysis
differs substantially from this strand of the literature in that I abstract from delays
in rescheduling. I focus on the recurrence of a default after the rescheduling has taken
place. The fundamental issue in the crises of the 1980s did not seem to be the inability of
the lenders to negotiate with the sovereign, but rather the ineffectiveness of the resulting
reschedulings. Mexico, for example, rescheduled its debt obligations five times before the
Brady rescheduling of 1990 concluded this default spree. Each one of these reschedulings
proved to be ineffective, in that it resulted in further debt servicing difficulties. I argue
here that these debt-servicing difficulties were in fact benefiting the lenders.
There are two papers I draw from to build my different mechanisms. The first one is
that of Cole and Kehoe (2000). In their paper, the authors formally introduce the idea
of roll over crises in a sovereign debt model. In their model, sovereigns first raise funds
from the sale of bonds and, using those funds, choose whether to repay their obligations
or abscond with the money. This timing gives rise to multiple equilibria. For high
enough debt levels, in one equilibrium, the lenders provide enough liquidity in the first
23
place so that the sovereign can repay all obligations. However, for the same debt, lenders
fear no one else will purchase the sovereigns bonds. If this happens and they are the
only ones to purchase the bonds, the sovereign will not have sufficient funds to repay
the obligations. As a result, the sovereign will end up keeping the individual lenders
funds. Knowing this, the lenders choose not to extend funds if they think no one else
will, and this results in an equilibrium where the sovereign defaults because the lenders
do not provide the necessary liquidity. In my model, I use the second equilibrium to
justify the provision of the IMF funding. The IMF, in my scenario, will provide funds to
sovereigns for debt levels such as those discussed above, where the markets are unwilling
to provide liquidity, but the sovereign can still pay down its debt if enough financial
support is provided.
The second paper I will be drawing from is Aguiar and Amador (2013). This paper
introduces to the sovereign debt literature a different default mechanism. Following
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), many influential papers, such as Arellano (2008) and Aguiar
and Gopinath (2007), have focused on output fluctuations as the main mechanism that
leads to sovereign defaults. When countries experience a drop in output, they choose
to suspend payments of their debt because the value of consumption in those periods
exceeds costs associated with default such as loss of market access and output costs. In
Aguiar and Amador (2013) output does not fluctuate. Sovereigns choose not to default
because the cost of defaulting is too high. However, the cost of default fluctuates and
sovereigns who are highly indebted may find that if the cost of default becomes lower
in the future, they will default5.
In studying emergence from default I will be using this mechanism. The cost of
default in my model may at any point decrease. This decrease in the cost of default is
meant to capture reductions in external political pressure applied to countries to service
their debts. An example is the Brady era during the 1990s. The US government, after
a decade of pushing Latin American countries to service their debts, decided to take a
less strict stance, and the result of this change was the Brady era. During this time
5 I abstract from the spanning motive pointed out in Angeletos (2002) that would be present with
income fluctuations. This motive would give the sovereign an incentive to keep its debt in arrears and
not reschedule. The idea of how this motive works is that when output is low, the price of rolling over
debt is also low. The sovereign may therefore want to keep debt in arrears while reducing its debt with
the IMF in order to avoid these kinds of price fluctuations. However, IMF prices do not tend to be
responsive to default risk, which is why I abstract from this motive.
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significant debt reduction took place, sanctioned by the US.
Another theme in the discussion of the defaults in the 1980s was that of debt over-
hang. That is, excessive debt burden crowded out investment, thereby leading to a
slowdown in growth. A paper quantifying this mechanism is Cohen (1993) and there
are many other theoretical and empirical papers referenced in the survey by Rogoff and
Zettelmeyer (2002). The argument was that the lenders could benefit both the sovereign
and themselves by reducing the debt burden, since with less debt, higher output growth
would make debt servicing of the remaining debt easier. I do not address this issue in my
paper, since even if such a mechanism were at play here, absent delays in rescheduling,
the lenders would take it into account and adjust their haircuts accordingly. My result
that the haircut is bigger in the lending into arrears world would be unaffected by such
a mechanism.
2.3 Data
In this section, I highlight two main empirical findings. The first is that debt servicing
improved after the 1989 shift in the IMF policy to permit lending into arrears. The
second is that sovereign debt lenders’ losses associated with debt restructurings were
substantially larger after 1989. I will focus on the relatively recent period from 1975 to
2010 for which the data is available.
2.3.1 Debt Servicing Ability
The measure of debt servicing ability I will be using is whether the sovereign defaults
again on its debts after a rescheduling6. I look at the short term, which is no more than
three years after the rescheduling event.
Here I follow the Standard & Poor’s definition of default. According to this defini-
tion, a sovereign enters default when missing payments on debt obligations or “tenders
an exchange offer of new debt with less-favorable terms than the original issue.” More
importantly, a country will be considered to be in default up to the point in time where
6 I use this measure because my model has implications on the probability of sovereigns falling back
into default after a rescheduling.
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“a settlement occurs and Standard & Poor’s concludes that no further near-term reso-
lution of creditors’ claims is likely.”
An example that highlights this key aspect of the default definition is the 1980’s
Mexico default. According to this definition of emergence from default, Mexico was in
continuous default from 1982 to 1990 when the Brady deal took place, whereas other
researchers vary in their assessment from as few as 4 distinct defaults to as many as 23
as pointed out in Tomz and Wright (2012).
The example of Mexico is clear cut, in that Mexico restructured its debts six times
between 1982 and 1990 and defaulted repeatedly. An example that is less clear-cut is
Argentina in the 2000s. S&P considered Argentina as having emerged from default in
2005 (listing only holdout debt as in a state of default). In the near term, no resolution
of claims took place (the first rescheduling took place in 2010). However, Argentina
was, for all intents and purposes, excluded from financial markets until 2016. Defining
default is quite tricky and each definition has its own drawbacks. Here I apply the
Standard & Poor’s definition.
One Two Three
Pre ’89 0.81 0.86 0.93
Post ’89 0.32 0.35 0.35
Table 2.1: Fraction of sovereigns in default t years after rescheduling
The sample is split evenly into 100 restructuring deals before 1989 and 84 episodes
thereafter. Table 2.1 reports the fraction of sovereigns who defaulted one, two, and three
years after their rescheduling7, before the policy change, pre ’89, and after the policy
change, post ’89. As can be seen, a far larger fraction of the pre ’89 group defaulted
again after restructuring their debts. In particular, the post ’89 group starts off with far
less sovereigns in default, 32% compared to the 81% in the pre ’89 sample. Furthermore,
in time quite a few more countries fall back into default in the Pre ’89 sample, whereas
in the post ’89 sample this increase is very small.
7 Even longer horizons display this pattern. However, the further into the future the less likely it is
that a default is related to the rescheduling
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2.3.2 Lenders Losses
The second empirical finding I will be documenting is that the lenders losses associated
with sovereign debt have increased substantially since 1989. There are a few ways of
measuring losses in the empirical sovereign debt literature. I will be using the one
introduced by Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006 & 2008) and applied to the universe
of debt restructurings from 1970-2010 by Cruces and Trebesch (2013). Restructurings
generally tend to involve some form of explicit haircut and exchanges of existing debt
instruments for different ones. The measure introduced by the aforementioned authors
captures both forms of reduction in value. In particular, using data on market interest
rates (or imputed market rates) the authors are able to measure the net present values
of old debt and the new debt offered as a result of the rescheduling. The formula to
measure the implied losses is the following,
Losses = 1− NPV New Debt
NPV Old Debt
Where NPV stands for net present value calculated using the yields after the ex-
change becomes known, New Debt is the debt instrument offered as part of the exchange
and Old Debt is the debt prior to the exchange.
Using this measure of investor losses, I break the period into three sub-periods, as in
Cruces and Trebesch. The first period is the pre-Brady era 1978-1989 (99 observations),
the second one is the Brady era 1990-1997 (48 observations), and the last is the post-
Brady era 1998-2010 (40 observations). The Brady era was right after the debt crises
of the 1980s where a plan was made to help sovereigns emerge from default. Large
write-offs were associated with this plan. I broke down the data in this way to prevent
Brady era write-offs from driving the larger investor losses in the post ’89 period. As
can be seen in table 2.2, this is not the case. The rate of market losses increased from
around a quarter before ’89 to around a half in the Brady era, and it remained stable
past this era. The median write-offs, in fact, increase past the Brady era.
An important question is whether the differences presented above are in fact statisti-
cally significant. To address this question, I conduct the MannWhitney U test pairwise
in these observations. This test is a non-parametric test on the null hypothesis that
two samples are coming from a distribution with the same median. The tests on pre ’89
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Mean W Median W
1978-1989 0.25 0.24
1990-1997 0.51 0.43
1998-2010 0.52 0.54
Table 2.2: Lenders lose W cents to the dollar
on Brady and post Brady reject the null hypothesis strongly (the larger one of the two
has a p value of 5.99e-06). On the other hand, the test on the pre and post Brady era
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two come from the same distribution, and in
fact the p value is 0.87.
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Model
There are two stages in my model. In the first stage, the rescheduling game, the lenders
and the sovereign reschedule the arrears. The second stage, the deleveraging stage,
takes place once the arrears have been rescheduled. At this stage the sovereign inherits
a debt position of maturing debts and arrears from the rescheduling stage. Given this
debt portfolio the sovereign in this stage decides whether it wants to continue servicing
these debts or not. I start by describing the deleveraging stage, and then turn to the
rescheduling game.
In the deleveraging stage, the sovereign has to repay all maturing debts to avoid
default. The arrears holders also have the ability to trigger default if the sovereign does
not repay its debts. I start by modeling the deleveraging stage without the presence of
an IMF program. The sovereign can sell single period debt to the lenders. The interest
rate schedule features the mechanism introduced in Cole and Kehoe (2000) of rollover
crises. In particular, for high enough debt levels the sovereign would repay its debts if
the markets were to lend at market prices. However, the markets do not purchase the
sovereigns bonds, and default ensues.
The IMF steps in for debt levels like the ones described above. The IMF program
provides necessary liquidity for the sovereign to avoid outright default. The interest
rates the IMF charges on its debts are larger than the risk free interest rates, and as a
result the sovereign will want to reduce its debt to the point where it can return to the
markets and enjoy lower interest rates.
I consider two forms of IMF financing. In the first, IMF financing is conditional on
the absence of outstanding arrears, as was the case with no lending into arrears. The
second imposes no condition on outstanding arrears. The IMF is given the ability to
prevent the arrears holders from triggering default.
The lender is risk neutral, and the sovereign is risk averse. It will be assumed that
the discount factors β of the two are the same, so that in the absence of any default
risk the sovereign will just want to roll over the debt and pay gross interest 1 + r = 1β
on the existing obligations.
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2.4 Deleveraging Stage
2.4.1 The environment
The sovereign starts with remaining arrears, BA, and maturing debt BM after the
rescheduling game at which time it has to choose a consumption sequence {ct}∞t=0 subject
to its ability to transfer income through time. In addition, there will be uncertainty
over the cost associated with defaulting again. The cost can take the value of
¯
α and α¯,
where 0 <
¯
α < α¯ < 1. At time zero, the cost is at its high level at α¯. The probability
of switching from the high cost to the low cost is λ, and I assume that the low cost
is absorbing. I denote a history of costs as st = {α0, α1, ..., αt}, and I suppress the
dependence of variables on this history. The sovereign ranks different consumption
streams using the following utility function,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
where the sovereigns period utility function, u, is strictly concave, and twice continu-
ously differentiable. The sovereign discounts time at rate β ∈ (0, 1) and the expectation
is taken over history of costs, st at time zero.
The budget constraint the sovereign faces at time t is,
ct ≤ (1− αt(1− zpt ))y + (1− ht)qM,tBM,t+1 + htqI,tBI,t+1−
− [zt(1− ht) + ht](BM,t +BI,t)R− (rht + ztxt(1− ht)R)BA,t
(2.1)
Output in the economy takes the form of a constant endowment of the consumption
good, y. The decision of the sovereign to default is represented by zt and it takes the
value of zero if the sovereign defaults and one otherwise. The variable zpt takes the
value of one if default has never taken place in the past and zero otherwise8. If the
sovereign defaults in period t output drops to 1 − αty, and the cost of period t + j is
applied to the output after that. The next objects in the budget constraint are the
revenues from selling debt BM,t+1 to the markets or BI,t+1 to the IMF. The sovereign
has to choose which one of the two to access, and this choice is represented by ht. A
value of one represents that the sovereign has asked for IMF help and therefore it does
not access the markets. The prices in the two may differ, and in particular qM,t is
the price the sovereign gets in the markets, and qI,t is the IMF price. The final term
30
represents the repayments that have to be made if the sovereign chooses not to default.
Since the sovereign has not defaulted, it has to repay maturing debt and IMF debt,
plus the interest rate r. R represents the gross interest rate, 1 + r. Arrears repayment
is as follows. The sovereign has to repay r interest rate on the arrears if it chooses to
enter the IMF program. On the other hand, if help is not requested, and default does
not take place, the sovereign may choose whether it wants to repay the arrears or not.
The variable xt takes the value of one if the sovereign chooses to repay the arrears plus
interest rate r.
The dynamics of the arrears can now be fully characterized using the variables
introduced above,
BA,t+1 = (1− zt)(BM,t +BI,t +BA,t)R+ [zt(1− xt)(1− ht)R+ ht]BA,t
In period t starting with BA,t in arrears the sovereign can either default, or not. If it
does default, zt = 0, then maturing debts, IMF debts and past arrears all become next
periods arrears, BA,t+1. I assume that arrears increase in value by the risk free interest
rate r. If the sovereign does not default, zt = 1, then there are two possibilities in which
arrears are not cleared. The first one is the one where the sovereign does not ask for
help, and at the same time does not repay the arrears, xt = 0. In this case the arrears
remain and increase by interest rate r. Finally, the sovereign may also ask for help,
in which case arrears are not repaid. However, interest rate r is repaid to the arrears
holders during the program, and as a result the value of arrears does not increase.
The second set of agents in the model is a unit mass of lenders. The preferences of a
representative lender over consumption stream {cLt }∞t=0 is given by the following utility
function,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtcLt
As can be seen, the lenders, in contrast to the sovereign, are risk neutral. Further, they
are assumed to have the same discount factor as the sovereign, β. The budget constraint
8 Formally,
zpT =
T−1∏
t=0
zt
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of the representative lender is the following,
cLt ≤ yL + [zt(1− ht) + ht]bM,tR+ (ztxt(1− ht)R+ htr)bA,t − qM,tbM,t+1
She gets a fixed endowment yL of the consumption good every period. It is assumed that
she has deep pockets, in that yL is large enough where she is never constrained in lending
to the sovereign. In the case that the sovereign does not default, she gets back all her
holdings of maturing debt, bM,t. In addition she may be paid any outstanding arrears
she holds, if the sovereign chooses to honor the arrears, and finally, if the sovereign
chooses to ask for help, she is paid interest r on her arrears.
The law of motion for her arrears mimics the sovereigns one,
bM,t+1 = (1− zt)(bM,t + bA,t)R+ [zt(1− xt)(1− ht)R+ ht]bA,t
as can be seen, the only difference is that the accounting of arrears only includes her
holding of arrears, and in case of sovereign default, any maturing debts.
Finally, I model the IMF preferences and budget constraint in the exact same way
as that of the lenders.
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtcIt
cIt ≤ yI + [zt(1− ht) + ht]B˜I,tR+ (ztxt(1− ht)R+ htr)B˜A,t − qI,tB˜I,t+1
B˜A,t+1 = (1− zt)(B˜I,t + B˜A,t)R+ [zt(1− xt)(1− ht)R+ ht]B˜A,t
I now define the program of lending into arrears.
Definition 1. The IMF is said to not lend into arrears when it does not lend, B˜I,t+1 =
0, to a sovereign who has outstanding arrears, BA,t > 0. On the other hand, the IMF
program of lending into arrears is one without this constraint.
Timing: I denote the sovereign by S, and the lenders by L,
1. S decides whether to ask for help or not, ht
2. If help is not requested:
(a) S auctions debt, BM,t+1, at price, qM,t
(b) L purchase debt, bM,t+1
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(c) S chooses whether to default or not, zt
3. If help is requested:
(a) S chooses how much to borrow from the IMF, BI,t+1, at price, qI,t
Market clearing conditions for debts and arrears imply the following equalities,
BM,t+1 = bM,t+1, BI,t+1 = B˜I,t+1, and finally, BA,t+1 = bA,t+1 + B˜A,t+1. That is, debt
issued by the sovereign has to be purchased by the lenders, the choice of IMF borrowing
has to coincide with IMF lending, and finally arrears are the sum of arrears to lenders
and to the IMF. Also the following initial conditions hold, bA,0 = BA, bM,0 = BM ,
B˜I,0 = 0, and finally, B˜I,0 = 0
Assumptions
Assumption 1. The IMF makes zero profits from lending each period. Formally,
qI,t =
∑
st+1|st
pist+1|st [zt+1(1− ht+1) + ht+1] (2.2)
where pist+1|st is the probability of going from state st to st+1
Assumption 2. Arrears holders, in the absence of the IMF, can block repayment of
maturing debts. That is, xt = 1 in all contingencies, s
t, and time periods, t.
Assumption 3. Define B¯ as,
V¯ρ :=
u((1−
¯
α)y)
1− β =
u(y − rB¯)
1− β
then α¯ satisfies the following inequality,
¯
Vρ :=
1
1− (1− λ)β
(
λ
r
u((1−
¯
α)y) + u((1− α¯)y)
)
≤ u(y − (1 + r)B¯) + β u(y)
1− β (2.3)
Assumption 1 (a) pins down the price of IMF debt. In particular, given the
preferences and discount factor of the IMF, this assumption implies that the price of
IMF debt is in fact the market price.
Assumption 2 captures holdout problems. Holdout problems are common in the
sovereign debt workouts, and the assumption that the lenders can block repayments
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captures this type of problem. In this setup the IMF is able to apply pressure and
prevent holdouts. The extent to which the IMF can and does apply such pressure is not
well studied. This assumption can be relaxed significantly by endogenizing the choice
to repay the arrears, xt. Such a model would not bring additional insight but would
greatly complicate the analysis.
In assumption 3 I impose an upper bound on α¯. In particular, equation 2.3
guarantees that only the IMF is willing to lend to the sovereigns, in the equilibrium I
study, when there is a risk of insolvency. It is not a crucial assumption, but it makes
the characterization easier. Notice that the Vρ are the lifetime payoffs of a sovereign
who defaults and stays in default indefinitely.
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2.4.2 Markov Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept I will study is that of a Markov equilibrium. The sovereign
cannot commit to a consumption and borrowing sequence at the beginning of time.
Instead, every time period the sovereign picks a consumption level and how much debt
to issue at the current period. If the sovereign chooses to default, in this environment,
it chooses to remain in default indefinitely. The reasoning is that having defaulted, the
cost of default is imposed independently of whether the arrears are repaid or not. The
sovereign has no other reason to repay past debts other than to avoid the cost of default.
Therefore, in case of default the sovereign gets value Vρ defined in Assumption 3. This
value is the only uncertain object in this environment.
Coming into each period the sovereign needs to repay either the lenders or the IMF
to avoid default. In particular, in period t the amount it needs to repay in maturing
debts is (BM,t + BI,t)R. From the point of view of the sovereign, knowledge of the
identity of the creditor at time t is unnecessary. For ease of notation, I will denote all
maturing debts as BS . The sovereign then, at any given period, requires knowledge of
maturing debt, BS , arrears, BA, and cost of default summarized by Vρ. I will summarize
this periods debt portfolio in the following vector, B = (BA, BS)
I begin at the end of the time period. The value to the sovereign of repaying its
debt is,
VR(Vρ,B, B
′
S) = u(c) + βEV ′ρ |VρW (V
′
ρ, B
′
S , B
′
A = 0)
where,
c = y + qM (Vρ,B, B
′
S)B
′
S − (1 + r)(BS +BA)
This is the budget constraint in equation 2.1 for the case where ht = 0 and zt = 1. The
price depends on the total level of indebtedness of the sovereign, and the amount of
debt auctioned in the current period. The sovereign consumes whatever remains after
the debts are settled and new debts are issued, and then continues to the next period,
by discounting the future at rate β and starting again at W . At that time there is a new
cost of default V ′ρ, and repayment has to be made on bonds issued today, B′S . Finally,
arrears have been cleared in the current period and as a result B′A = 0.
The problem of the sovereign after having chosen not to ask for help is,
Vnh(Vρ,B) = max
B′S ,B
′
A=0,z∈{0,1}
(1− z)Vρ + zVR(Vρ,B, B′S) (2.4)
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As can be seen at this stage, the sovereign chooses the amount of debt to be auctioned,
B′S , and whether to default or not, z.
The problem of the sovereign if help is chosen looks as follows,
Vh(Vρ,B) = max
B′S ,B
′
A=BA
u(c) + βEV ′ρ |VρW (V
′
ρ, B
′
S , B
′
A)
s.t.
c = y + qI(Vρ,B, B
′
S)B
′
S − (1 + r)BS − rBA
(2.5)
The budget constraint is as in equation 2.1 for the case where ht = 1. The sovereign
now faces the IMF price, and maintains any arrears at their current level after paying
interest on them.
The decision of the sovereign to request help is,
W (Vρ,B) = max
h∈C(B)
hVh(Vρ,B) + (1− h)Vnh(Vρ,B) (2.6)
The constraint, C(B), is a subset of {0, 1} since the sovereign decides whether to ask for
help, h = 1, or not, h = 0. This constraint summarizes the IMF policy, and is discussed
in detail in the next section.
The decision rules for the choice of asking for help, h, how much debt to issue, B′,
and whether to default or not, z, are going to be denoted as, h(Vρ,B), B
′(Vρ,B, h), and
z(Vρ,B,B
′). Also I denote the final decision to default or repay given the sovereigns
equilibrium choice of issuance of bonds to lenders, as,
z∗(Vρ,B) = z(Vρ,B,B′(Vρ,B, 0)) (2.7)
The market price is determined by,
qM (Vρ,B, B
′
S) = z(Vρ,B,B
′)EV ′ρ |Vρ [h(V
′
ρ,B
′) + (1− h(V ′ρ,B′))z∗(V ′ρ,B′)] (2.8)
where, B′ = (B′S , B
′
A = 0). The lenders, being risk neutral and competitive, price
the sovereigns debt according to its expected return. The term in the expectation
summarizes the sovereigns repayment choice in the next period. The sovereign may also
default after the auction and this possibility is accounted for in the z term.
The IMF price is,
qI(Vρ,B, B
′
S) = EV ′ρ |Vρ [h(V
′
ρ,B
′) + (1− h(V ′ρ,B′))z∗(V ′ρ,B′)] (2.9)
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where, B′ = (B′S , B
′
A = BA). This price is a direct product of the IMF zero profit
condition in equation 2.2.
The only difference of the two prices is the z(Vρ,B,B
′) term. Mechanically, this
term is absent from the IMF price because at the time IMF lending takes place, the
sovereign has already chosen to repay current obligations. What I am modeling in
this way is the ability of the IMF, as a single large lender, to avoid the coordination
problems.
Equilibrium 1. Given an IMF lending policy C, a Markov equilibrium of the Delever-
aging Stage consists of value function, W , policy functions, h, B′ and z, and price
schedules, qM and qI such that:
1. Given price schedules, qM and qI , and value function, W , the policy functions, h,
B′ and z, solve the sovereigns problems in equations 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6
2. Given policy functions, h, B′ and z and z∗ as defined in equation 2.7, the price
schedules, qM and qI , are solutions to the pricing rules in equations 2.8 and 2.9
IMF Policies
The following are the IMF policy functions, C, I will be studying,
1. No IMF : C(·) = {0}
2. No Lending into Arrears:
CNLIA(BS , BA) =
 {0} if BA > 0{0, 1} if BA = 0
3. Lending into Arrears: CLIA(·) = {0, 1}
The last two are as defined in definition 1. The first one I study to highlight the
mechanism of rollover crises, that provides a role for the IMF.
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2.4.3 Characterization without the IMF
Theorem 1. Given C(BS , BA) = {0}, a Markov equilibrium is:
Market Price:
qM (Vρ,B, B
′
S) =
1 if B ∈ S,B′S ∈ ¯B(BS +BA, Vρ)0 otherwise
Value function:
W (Vρ,B) =

u(y−r(BA+BS))
1−β if B ∈ S
Vρ otherwise
Debt policy:
B′(Vρ,B) =
(B′S = BS +BA, B′A = 0) if B ∈ S(B′S = 0, B′A = 0) otherwise
Default outcomes:
z∗(Vρ,B) =
1 if B ∈ S0 otherwise
where S, the safe region, is defined as,
S =
{
B
∣∣∣∣∣u(y − r(BS +BA))1− β ≥ V¯ρ
}
A sovereign comes out of the rescheduling game with BS in maturing debts, and
BA in arrears. The sovereign has to repay the maturing debts to avoid default. At the
same time, as discussed above, the arrears holders can trigger default if the sovereign
does not repay its debts. In this equilibrium there are two distinct experiences depending
on the total amount of debt.
Since β(1 + r) = 1, a sovereign facing risk-free borrowing wants to keep con-
sumption constant and to do so, it has to set B′S = BS + BA, i.e., roll over the in-
coming debt. In the safe region doing so is possible, since if B ∈ S, it follows that
(0, BS + BA) ∈
¯
B(BS + BA, Vρ) and borrowing is risk free
9. The payoff the sovereign
gets from following this strategy indefinitely is,
u(y − r(BS +BA))
1− β
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and by the definition of the safe zone this is preferred to defaulting. As a result the
lenders are justified in charging the risk-free price in the safe zone.
Outside of the safe region the sovereign defaults. The sovereign is not able to
borrow at all from the financial markets, since market prices are zero. The only option
left to avoid default is to fully repay arrears and maturing debts. It turns out that given
the definition of being outside of the safe zone, if the state is V¯ρ, the sovereign would
rather default than fully repay all its debts. Similarly, assumption 3 guarantees that
the sovereign would rather default than fully repay its debts outside of the safe zone.
Given that the sovereign would rather default than repay its debts, the lenders, who
were considering purchasing the sovereigns debts, were justified in not lending.
It is in this region that the IMF can help. For low enough debt levels outside
of the safe region if the sovereign had been able to sell its bonds, default would have
been averted. However, lenders in this environment cannot coordinate, and believing
no other lender will be willing to lend, they also find it optimal to not lend. The IMF
can enter as a large lender, and in providing financing, it can prevent default.
2.4.4 Characterization with the IMF
Theorem 2. Given Cp(BS , BA), where p ∈ {LIA,NLIA}, a Markov equilibrium is:
Market price:
qM (Vρ,B, B
′
S) =

1 if B ∈ S,B′S ∈ ¯B(BS +BA, Vρ)
1− λ if B ∈ S,B′S ∈ B¯(BS +BA) and Vρ = ¯Vρ
0 otherwise
IMF price:
qI(Vρ,B, B
′
S) =

1 if B ∈ Ip,B′ ∈ S
1− λ if B ∈ Ip,B′ ∈ Ip and Vρ =
¯
Vρ
0 otherwise
9
¯
B(BS + BA, Vρ) is a subset of the safe region. The sovereign faces the price of zero in the
complement of this subset in S. This is a restriction that does not affect the equilibrium behavior of the
sovereign, and is made to guarantee off equilibrium behavior. More details can be found in the appendix
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Help policy:
h(Vρ,B) =
1 if B ∈ Ip and Vρ = ¯Vρ0 otherwise
Value function:
W (Vρ,B) =

u(y−r(BS+BA))
1−β if B ∈ S
maxT X(B, T ) if B ∈ Ip and Vρ =
¯
Vρ
Vρ otherwise
where,
1. B′ = (B′S , B
′
A = BA)
2. INLIA = {B|maxT X(B, T ) ≥
¯
Vρ, BS > B¯, BA = 0}
3. ILIA = {B|maxT X(B, T ) ≥
¯
Vρ, BS +BA > B¯}
Even though the IMF is present, the ability of the sovereign to sell debts in the
markets does not improve. Outside of the safe region, the sovereign is still unable to
sell bonds to the lenders. In the safe region, the markets are again willing to lend to the
sovereign. The only difference here is that in the safe region, the sovereign can sell debt
outside of the safe region to B¯(BS + BA) as can be seen in the market price. The set
B¯(BS + BA) is a subset of Ip, the region where the IMF is willing to lend. Therefore,
as long as the default cost does not decrease, starting from B¯(BS + BA) the sovereign
borrows from the IMF and repays its obligations. If the cost does change, the sovereign
defaults. This is why the price of debt in this region is 1 − λ. The sovereign, in this
equilibrium, never increases its debt outside of the safe region, despite having the ability
to do so.
Function X figures prominently outside of the safe region. This is the value of a
sovereign who enters a T period IMF program,
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X(BS , BA, T ) = max
{{BI,t}Tt=1},{ct}T−1t=0 }
T−1∑
t=0
βt(1− λ)tu(ct) +
T−1∑
t=1
λ(1− λ)t−1βtV¯ρ + (1− λ)T−1βT u(y − r(BI,T +BA))
1− β
s.t.
c0 + (1 + r)BS + rBA = y + (1− λ)BI,1
ct + (1 + r)BI,t + rBA = y + (1− λ)BI,t+1 t = 1, 2, ..., T − 2
cT−1 + (1 + r)BI,T−1 + rBA = y +BI,T
BI,T +BA ≤ B¯
BI,t +BA > B¯ t = 1, 2, ..., T − 1
ct ≥ 0 BI,t+1 ≥ 0 t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1
The sovereign has to reduce its debt in T periods so that it can return to the
market, BI,T + BA ≤ B¯. The IMF only lends to the sovereign when it does not have
access to the markets, i.e., when BI,T +BA > B¯. Further, during the first T −2 periods
the sovereign receives (1 − λ) units of consumption for each bond it issues, while in
period T − 1 it receives one unit of consumption for each bond. In the first period it
pays back (1 + r)BS to lenders whose debt is maturing. In addition rBA is paid to the
arrear holders for the duration of the program.
The cost may switch at any period with probability λ. The probability that it
switches in period t > 1 and in no previous period is λ(1 − λ)t−1. If this happens the
sovereign defaults. On the other hand, the probability at any given period that V¯ρ has
not realized is (1− λ)t. In this contingency the sovereign pays back the maturing debt,
issues new bonds and consumes whatever remains of the output.
The IMF program
Lemma 1. In a T period IMF program the following hold:
1. The constraint,
BI,T +BA ≤ B¯ (2.10)
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holds with equality.
2. For the duration of the program debt is decreasing.
3. Consumption is constant, and satisfies,
T−1∑
t=0
β˜t(y − c) = (1 + r)BS +
T−1∑
t=0
β˜trBA − β˜T−1(B¯ −BA) (2.11)
where, β˜ = β(1− λ).
The constraint in equation 2.10 holds with equality since if the sovereign is left un-
constrained, it would choose to borrow outside of the safe region. The reasoning is that
in doing so it transfers resources to the times when borrowing is more costly. Therefore,
the sovereign borrows up to the point where the constraint holds with equality.
The fact that consumption is constant for the duration of the program follows
from the fact that the price charged on debt reflects the probability that the sovereign
does in fact default in the subsequent period. In addition to this the sovereign is not
constrained by the BI,t +BA > B¯ constraint, allowing perfect consumption smoothing.
Decreasing debt is required to guarantee consumption can be kept constant for the
duration of the program. Finally, the T period budget constraint in equation 2.11
results from summing up the first T − 1 period budget constraints.
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2.5 Rescheduling Game
In the first stage, the sovereign and lenders negotiate over the arrears. The sovereign
enters this game with maturing debt, B˜S , and arrears, B˜A. The lenders offer a new
debt position to the sovereign with BS in maturing debts and BA in arrears. If the
sovereign accepts the debt offer it begins the deleveraging with the new debt position.
On the other hand, if the offer is rejected, the sovereign has two options. It may either
enter the deleveraging with its initial debt position, or it may pay back the arrears at
their face value plus some interest. The second option amounts to moving to the new
portfolio of debt where the maturing debt is B˜S + B˜A, and the arrears are zero.
I denote the net present value of a portfolio of maturing debt, BS , and arrears,
BA, as V
L(BS , BA). The lenders solve the following problem,
max
BS ,BA
V L(BS , BA)
W (
¯
Vρ, BS , BA) ≥ max{W (
¯
Vρ, B˜S , B˜A),W (
¯
Vρ, B˜S + B˜A, 0)}
As described above the sovereign can choose between accepting the offer of the IMF and
get W (
¯
Vρ, BS , BA), rejecting the offer of the IMF and keeping the original portfolio of
debt to get, W (
¯
Vρ, B˜S , B˜A), and finally, paying back the arrears in full to get W (
¯
Vρ, B˜S+
B˜A, 0). The constraint to the problem guarantees that the sovereign prefers the offer of
the lenders to the alternatives. As can be seen in the value of the sovereign, W (
¯
Vρ, ·, ·),
the state in the first period is the high cost state,
¯
Vρ.
2.5.1 Characterization without the IMF
Lemma 2. Given B˜S and B˜A, let B
∗
S and B
∗
A be the solution to the rescheduling game:
1. If B˜S + B˜A ≤ B¯ then B∗S +B∗A = B˜S + B˜A
2. If B˜S + B˜A > B¯ then B
∗
S +B
∗
A = B¯
Before discussing the outcome of the rescheduling game, I characterize the payoff
lenders get when the sovereign accepts an offer of BS in maturing debt and BA in arrears.
If the total debt is not too large BS + BA ≤ B¯, the lenders receive full repayment,
plus interest, in the first period. On the other hand, if the total debt is too onerous,
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BS + BA > B¯, the sovereign defaults in the first period and the lenders do not get
anything.
Remark 1. The value of BS in maturing debt and BA in arrears to the lenders is,
V L(BS , BA) =
(1 + r)(BS +BA) if BS +BA ≤ B¯0 otherwise
In figure 2.1 there are two initial debt portfolios (B˜1A, B˜
1
S) and (B˜
2
A, B˜
2
S). Starting
with (B˜1A, B˜
1
S) the lenders would want to offer to the sovereign a (B
1
A, B
1
S) with more
total debt. However, the sovereign could always reject the offer and stay with the initial
debt and do better. Therefore, the initial debt is the most the lender can get out of the
rescheduling.
Figure 2.1: B˜1, B˜2: initial portfolios, B1: rescheduled portfolio
On the other hand, if the original portfolio is (B˜2A, B˜
2
S) there are improvements
that can be made by moving to the safe region. By picking a debt position on the
boundary of the safe region, say (B2A, B
2
S), lenders can certainly not do any better since
by increasing the debt, they would trigger a default. The sovereign is also better off
at (B2A, B
2
S) than it would have been at (B˜
2
A, B˜
2
S). As a result (B
2
A, B
2
S) satisfies the
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constraint of the sovereign. So the lender offers (B2A, B
2
S) in the rescheduling and the
sovereign accepts.
2.5.2 Characterization with “No Lending into Arrears”
Lemma 3. Given B˜S and B˜A, let B
∗
S and B
∗
A be the solution to the rescheduling game:
1. If B˜S + B˜A ≤ B¯ then B∗S +B∗A = B˜S + B˜A
2. If B˜S + B˜A > B¯ then B
∗
A = 0 and B
∗
S = min{Bˆ, B˜S + B˜A}
where, Bˆ is defined as the solution to maxT X(Bˆ, 0, T ) =
¯
Vρ
When the IMF provides financing, the lenders are able to receive payment on
their debts that exceeds B¯. In particular, as long as the sovereign does not have any
outstanding arrears, the amount of maturing debt the lenders can receive expands up
to debt levels where the sovereign would be willing to take the IMF program.
Remark 2. The value of BS in maturing debt and BA in arrears to the lenders is,
V L(BS , BA) =

(1 + r)BS if (BS , BA) ∈ INLIA
(1 + r)(BS +BA) if BS +BA ≤ B¯
0 otherwise
where, INLIA is defined in theorem 2
Starting from any point in the safe region, there is no improvement that can
be made, so the sovereign pays off the arrears and rolls over debt as in the no IMF
world. Outside of the safe region IMF lending changes the outcome of the rescheduling.
Consider an initial debt position of (B˜1A, B˜
1
S) depicted in figure 2.2. If no rescheduling
takes place, the sovereign defaults, as the IMF does not lend in arrears, and the markets
are not willing to lend for such high debt levels. Both the sovereign and the lender would
benefit from the initial debt position moving to (0, B˜1A + B˜
1
S). The lenders receive the
whole value of arrears and maturing debt, which is clearly preferable to receiving nothing
after a sovereign default at the initial debt position. The largest amount of maturing
debt the sovereign is willing to repay is Bˆ defined in lemma 3. Since, B˜1A + B˜
1
S is less
than this amount, as depicted in figure 2.2, the sovereign is better off as well. If the
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Figure 2.2: Rescheduling in “No Lending into Arrears”
lender were to offer any debt position with more debt than B˜1A+B˜
1
S the sovereign would
reject, repay the arrears and gain access to the IMF program. Therefore, the lenders
cannot force any more debt on the sovereign. On the other hand, lenders are worse
off from any debt position with less debt than B˜1A + B˜
1
S . Therefore, the rescheduling
outcome is (0, B˜1A + B˜
1
S)
The outcome of the rescheduling is different when the original debt position is
(B˜2A, B˜
2
S). A rescheduling outcome of (0, B˜
2
A + B˜
2
S) is undesirable both to the sovereign
and the lenders. The reason is that with this debt position, indebtedness, B˜2A + B˜
2
S
exceeds the critical threshold Bˆ, therefore the sovereign would rather default. On the
other hand, at debt position (0, Bˆ) the sovereign is indifferent between defaulting or not.
I will be assuming the sovereign does not default when indifferent. The lender cannot
force more debt than Bˆ on the sovereign without triggering default. Therefore, the
rescheduling outcome in this case is (0, Bˆ). These two cases illustrate why the outcome
of the rescheduling is the smallest of indebtedness, B˜A + B˜S , and the critical debt value
B.
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2.5.3 Characterization with “Lending into Arrears”
Lemma 4. Given B˜S and B˜A, let B
∗
S and B
∗
A be the solution to the rescheduling game:
1. If B˜S + B˜A ≤ B¯ then B∗S +B∗A = B˜S + B˜A
2. If B˜S+B˜A > B¯ then B
∗
A = 0 and B
∗
S = min{B∗, Bˆ} where, Bˆ is defined in lemma
3, and B∗ is defined in the following way,
max
T
X(B∗, 0, T ) = max
T
X(B˜S , B˜A, T )
I start again by describing the net present value of the debts. Here, the arrears
are held by the sovereign during the program. Consider a sovereign who has entered
an IMF program that lasts T ∗ periods. In the first period, the sovereign has to pay
off the maturing obligations with interest, (1 + r)BS , and pay interest on the arrears,
rBA. At any given period, say t, before the end of the program if the sovereign has
not defaulted it has to pay interest on the arrears rBA. The net present value to the
lender of this transaction is (1 − λ)tβtrBA. As discussed above, the lender discounts
time at rate β, and the probability the sovereign has not default in the first t periods
is (1 − λ)t. Finally, at time T ∗ the sovereign fully pays back the arrears with interest,
(1 + r)BA. The probability this contingency arises is (1−λ)T ∗−1 since default may only
take place in the first T ∗ − 1 periods. The net present value of this payment to the
lender is (1 − λ)T ∗−1βT ∗(1 + r)BA, and since β(1 + r) = 1, this can be simplified to
(1 − λ)T ∗−1βT ∗−1BA. It is the sum of these payments that the lenders receive outside
of the safe zone.
Remark 3. The value of BS in maturing debt and BA in arrears to the lenders is,
V L(BS , BA) =

(1 + r)BS +
∑T ∗−1
t=0 β˜
trBA + β˜
T ∗−1BA if (BS , BA) ∈ ILIA
(1 + r)(BS +BA) if BS +BA ≤ B¯
0 otherwise
where, ILIA is defined in theorem 2, T
∗ = argmaxTX(BS , BA, T ) and β˜ = β(1− λ)
The characterization of this rescheduling outcome rests on a very simple argument.
Given any initial debt position, (BA, BS), in ILIA there is a haircut, γ, such that in
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debt position (0, γBA +BS), both the sovereign and the lenders are at least as well off.
This γ turns out to be,
γ =
∑T ∗−1
t=0 β˜
tr + β˜T
∗−1
1 + r
where T ∗ is as defined in the remark. It is easy to check that the lender is indifferent
between getting a fraction γ of the arrears back in the current period or their full face
value in the future. It turns out that if the sovereign does not change the duration of
the IMF program, at (0, γBA+BS) it would also be indifferent between rescheduling or
not. Therefore, this haircut leaves both groups of agents at least as well off, implying
that I can focus on reschedulings that leave the sovereign with no arrears.
The rescheduling described above leaves the lender indifferent, and the sovereign at
least as well off. It turns out that with large enough arrears the sovereign is made strictly
better off. To understand why the sovereign may benefit from moving to (0, BS +γBA),
I start by considering the trade-off faced by a sovereign, with initial debt position
(BA, BS), in terms of the duration of the IMF program. The longer the sovereign
spends with the IMF, the less painful the reduction of debt. However, since borrowing
with the IMF is costly the sovereign will want to expedite the IMF program to avoid
the costly rolling over of debt.
This trade-off becomes slightly more complicated with the existence of arrears.
Now spending more time in the IMF program, albeit costly, may be beneficial to the
sovereign in that the low default cost may realize, in which case the sovereign will not
have to repay the arrears. This gives the sovereign an incentive to prolong the duration
of the IMF program. Suppose now that the lender trades the arrears, BA, for their net
present value at (BA, BS). The new debt position is (0, BS + γBA). Now the sovereign
no longer benefits from prolonging the duration of the IMF program. That is, a shorter
IMF program does not make the sovereign more likely to repay the arrears, since the
arrears have been extinguished. As a result the sovereign will now want to exit faster
to avoid making the costly interest rate payments to the IMF. This reduction in the
duration of the IMF program makes the sovereign better off relative to (BA, BS).
The sovereign has benefited from this exchange. Knowing this the lender will
reduce the haircut sufficiently to leave the sovereign indifferent between the initial debt
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position and the debt position with the new haircut,
max
T
X(B∗, 0, T ) = max
T
X(B˜S , B˜A, T )
and this is how B∗ arises in lemma 4.
2.5.4 Comparison of the two programs
Theorem 3. Given B˜S and B˜A, let B
NLIA
S and B
LIA
S be the outcomes of the reschedul-
ing games in the no lending into arrears and in the lending into arrears respectively.
Under the following assumptions,
1. maxT X(B˜S , B˜A, T ) >
¯
Vρ
2. maxT X(B˜S , B˜A, T ) > X(B˜S , B˜A, T = 1)
The write-offs are larger in the lending into arrears case,
B˜S + B˜A −BLIAS > B˜S + B˜A −BNLIAS
and the IMF program lasts at least as long in the no lending into arrears case than in
the lending into arrears case,
arg max
T
X(BNLIAS , 0, T ) ≥ arg max
T
X(BLIAS , 0, T )
The first thing to note is that the assumptions made here are sufficient conditions
to guarantee the strict inequality in the write-offs. Without these assumptions, the
inequalities would be the same, but the write-off inequality would be a weak inequality.
If the first assumption does not hold, then both rescheduling outcomes would result to
Bˆ. The reason is that the sovereign defaults if not for the rescheduling. As a result, the
lender can offer repayment of Bˆ in maturing debt and clearing of the arrears, and leave
the sovereign indifferent.
The importance of the second assumption will become clear when comparing the
two rescheduling outcomes. Consider the case where the outcome of the no lending into
arrears is full repayment of arrears B˜S + B˜A. The outcome of the lending into arrears
case is determined in the way described in lemma 4. The lender has to find a level of
maturing debts, B∗, that will leave the sovereign indifferent between entering the IMF
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program with arrears, maxT X(B˜S , B˜A, T ), and clearing the arrears, maxT X(B
∗, 0, T ).
One possibility is asking for full repayment of arrears, B˜S+B˜A. I have assumed that the
duration of the IMF program is longer than a period, assumption (b) in the theorem.
As a result, the sovereign is better off from keeping the arrears, since there is a chance
that it never has to repay the arrears if defaulting becomes less costly during the IMF
program. The lenders then have to write-off some of the arrears. As a result of the
write-off the sovereign enters the IMF program less indebted, and consequently may
spend less time in the program10.
10 The weak inequality in the duration of the program is a result of the assumption of time being
discrete. In continuous time, less debt will imply strictly less time in the IMF program
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2.6 Extensions
2.6.1 Are defaulters punished?
Cruces and Trebesch (2013) study countries after rescheduling, and they find that the
larger the haircut the longer it takes for a country to re-enter the sovereign debt markets.
In this section I will argue that a cross section of sovereigns differing in the cost of default
can explain the correlation between the size of the haircuts and the period of market
exclusion.
In their very influential paper, Bulow and Rogoff (1989) showed that to explain
countries ability to borrow from international financial markets sovereign default has to
be punished. This work led the empirical sovereign debt literature to focus on quantify-
ing these costs. Recent work in this field (see for instance Furceri and Zdzienicka (2011)
) has concluded that the costs associated with default are in fact quite heterogeneous
between countries. In this extension I will take this heterogeneity as given and show
how it can explain the correlation described above.
The two variables of interest are the haircut, and the period of market exclusion
after the rescheduling. Haircuts have been the main object of study in this work and
do not require any additional explanation. Market exclusion here will be defined as the
period the sovereign spends in the IMF. The sovereign during this time borrows from
the IMF and as result can be viewed as being excluded from the markets.
Cruces and Trebesch focus on “successful reschedulings”. Their definition rules
out most of the reschedulings that took place prior to the lending into arrears policy
implementation. In particular, of the sixty-seven cases studied only four pertain to the
period before 1989. As a result in this extension the policy of the IMF will be the
lending into arrears policy as defined above.
Consider an increase in the cost of default from
¯
α1 to
¯
α2. This will push the
boundary of the safe region out, from B¯1 to B¯2. It is easy to show that this change is
isomorphic to an environment where the boundary of the safe region and the cost of
default remain unchanged and the following two changes take place. First a decrease of
B¯2 − B¯1 in arrears and second an r(B¯2 − B¯1) increase in lifetime income.
Using the exponential family of utility functions, −e−αc, I emphasize the first
channel. A decrease in arrears implies that the sovereign wants to stay with the IMF
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for less time. This in turn implies that the lenders are less inclined to give a haircut
to the sovereign. Therefore, the sovereign ends up taking less time and gets a smaller
haircut.
The increase in income channel is more challenging to fully characterize. Numer-
ical exercises using the constant relative risk aversion, c
1−σ
1−σ , family of utility functions
indicate that decreases in the cost of default will tend to increase the period of market
exclusion and increase the haircut, as is illustrated in Table 2.3. The results of the
numerical exercises suggest that the second channel is acting in the same direction as
that of the first channel.
α Exclusion Haircut (%)
0.900 1 0
0.920 2 6
0.930 3 18
0.935 4 22
0.940 5 26
0.943 6 34
0.946 7 42
0.949 8 46
Table 2.3: Exclusion refers to market exclusion. Longer market exclusions associated
with larger haircuts
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I studied the policy of lending into arrears, in an environment with default
risk. I showed that rescheduling of arrears happens without delays in both the lending
into arrears and the no lending into arrears environment. Further, I showed that arrears
holders are able to get less money for their arrears since the policy of lending into arrears
was implemented. I also showed how this write-off implied that the likelihood that the
sovereign faces further debt servicing difficulties decreases even though the sovereign
was worse off as a result of it.
In my analysis I have emphasized the effect of the policy on lenders once the
sovereign has defaulted. A question, not addressed here, is what the effect of this policy
is on sovereigns ability to borrow from the markets during normal times. That is, once
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this policy has been implemented, I showed here that lenders will be able to recover
less of their funds in case of a sovereign default. However, when lending to sovereigns,
lenders will take this into account and charge higher interest rates. The sovereign may
be dissuaded from borrowing because of these higher interest rates. On the other hand,
borrowing is not as onerous, with default being a less painful process. Understanding
which of these two effects dominates may provide further insights as to why the IMF
has kept this policy.
Chapter 3
Capital Requirements and
Bailouts
with Fabrizio Perri Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and CEPR1
3.1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to provide a simple evaluation of the impact of changing capi-
tal requirements on the stability of the U.S. banking system. Our starting point is the
recent report on “Ending too Big to Fail”, produced by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis (2016). The report proposes a substantial increase of the capital require-
ments of the U.S. banking system, and it argues that this increase would improve the
resiliency of financial institutions in the face of a severe financial shock, like the 2008
crisis. Improving the resiliency of these institutions in turn makes the need for another
public bailout of the financial system less likely. The Minneapolis report estimates the
impact of the increase in capital requirements using international evidence on financial
crises in OECD countries, as discussed in Dagher et al (2016). In this work we conduct
a similar exercise, but instead of data on aggregate losses suffered by countries during
1 We thank Ron Feldman, Ken Heinecke, Neel Kashkari, Tom Tallarini and seminar participants
at the Minneapolis Fed for very valuable comments. Views expressed in this article are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, or the Federal Reserve
System
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financial crises, we use data from large U.S. financial institutions during the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis. The advantage of using data on financial institutions, besides providing
an additional check of the results in the report mentioned above, is that we can look
beyond aggregate outcomes, and assess how changing capital requirement would change
the distribution of losses across financial institutions during a crisis.
The idea behind our exercise is simple. We model a bank as an institution which
starts with some capital, raises some liabilities and invests these resources in risky assets.
During a financial crisis many banks experience losses on their assets and, if the ratio of
capital to assets is too low, they might not be able to repay their liabilities, triggering
financial instability. Our study uses data on the experience of major U.S. financial
institutions the 2008 financial crisis to estimate shocks to their net worth, and it uses
some simple modelling to assess how these shocks would have affected these institutions
under alternative (higher) capital requirements. The analysis will estimate these shocks
using two independent methodologies. The first is based on balance sheet data from
large US bank holding companies, as reported in the FR Y-9C dataset of the Federal
Reserve. The second is based on stock market data for top US bank holding companies.
At the end we will report results under both methodologies and contrast our findings
with the findings of the Minneapolis Fed report.
There are two important caveats regarding our exercise. The first is that through-
out the analysis we assume that in response to higher capital requirements banks will
change their capital structure, but will not change the risk of their investment choices.
This is clearly an important limitation of our analysis. Notice though that it is not
clear how endogenizing the risk choice of banks would change our results. It is con-
ceivable that in response to higher capital requirements (and thus less leverage) banks
would choose more risky investments, to compensate the reduction in risk forced by the
lower leverage. It is also possible that, having more of their own capital at stake, banks
might choose less risky investments. Overall we think that understanding how portfolio
choices of banks respond to capital requirements is important for a full assessment of
the impact of changes in this regulation. However, our analysis that abstracts from
these choices still constitutes a useful first step. The second caveat is that we do not
consider the costs of increasing capital requirements. This obviously does not mean
that we think that increasing capital requirements imposes no costs on the banking
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system and on the economy as a whole. The Minneapolis Fed report, as well as many
other studies discussed below, contains an extensive analysis of these costs, and those
studies can meaningfully compare benefits and costs, toward a theory of optimal capital
requirements. Our goal here is more modest, and it is simply to assess how much higher
capital requirements improve the stability of the financial system.
The effect of increasing capital requirements on the stability of the financial system
has been the subject of an intense academic and policy debate, in particular after the
2008 crisis. On the academic side, many studies argue that a substantial increase in
capital requirements would improve the stability of the financial system (see, e.g., Adnati
et al, 2016 or Egan et al, 2017), while other studies focus on the potentially high costs
of increasing capital requirements (see, e.g. Van Den Heuvel, 2008). There are also
quantitative structural studies, which develop fully fledged equilibrium models of an
economy with a banking sector, and can produce an evaluation of the full impact of
higher capital requirements, both in terms of increased stability and in terms of higher
costs. Among those studies the findings are mixed, with some studies (e.g. Begenau,
2016) finding that the benefits of increasing capital requirement likely exceeds the costs,
while others (e.g. Corbae and D’Erasmo, 2016) find that increasing capital requirements
would have high output costs for the economy as a whole. On the policy side a number
of studies (see for example the works by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
2010a,b, 2011) have been produced to assess the impact of increasing capital regulation.
Our work contributes to this line of work, using a different methodology.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the general framework,
sections 3 and 4 discuss the two methodologies and the key findings. Section 5 presents
some additional evidence in support of our findings and Section 6 concludes.
3.2 A simple framework
We model a bank (indexed by i) as an institution entering each period t with capital
Kit, liabilities (deposits or other form of borrowing) Lit, and assets Ait such that
Kit + Lit = Ait.
During period t, the bank invests its assets in several projects (loans, financial assets,
etc) which yield a stochastic payoff, and pays interest on its liabilities. We focus on the
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risk of banks not being able to repay their liabilities. Such a possibility could induce
bank failures, panic and systemic crisis. In particular, we assess how imposing a higher
capital requirement on banks, i.e. banks using less liabilities and more of their own
capital to finance its investments, affects this risk.
3.3 Using Balance Sheet data
In this exercise our sample is the 25 largest US bank holding companies in the FR Y-9C
dataset of the Federal Reserve, ranked by their 2006 assets. This is the same data used
by the Board of Governors (2015) to assess capital requirements on global systemically
important bank holding companies. We follow these banks for fourteen years, from 2001
to 2015 (see appendix for the list of bank holding companies). As one may expect in
such a time horizon there is large attrition in the banking industry, due to bankruptcy,
merger or acquisitions. We focus on banks that are in the sample for the entire period.
As a result this approach might underestimate the losses of bank holding companies.
We define the market value of capital for bank i in period t as follows,
KMit =
∞∑
j=0
(
1
1 + rB
)j
RKit+jKit, (3.1)
where rB is the rate at which the markets discount the future returns of the bank,
and RKit is the return to capital of bank i at time t. The market value of capital captures
the value of investing Kit units of bank capital. A large drop in the market value of
capital per unit of capital,
KMit
Kit
, will signify trouble for bank i. In this section we will
be using balance sheet data to infer the impact of the financial crisis that started in
2007 on the subsequent returns to capital {RKi2007+j}∞j=0 and, through equation 3.1 on
the market value of banks. First notice that returns to capital can be computed as
RKit =
Iit
Kit
(3.2)
where Iit represents net income of bank i in period t.
We start by estimating the crisis returns during the crisis directly using balance
sheet data. We then estimate the no-crisis returns under the assumption that the
financial crisis never took place. Finally, we compute counterfactual returns(both
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crisis and no-crisis), which are returns that the bank would have experienced had the
crisis occurred (or not occurred) with different capital requirements.
3.3.1 Returns and losses
For each of the banks in our sample we simply compute crisis-returns to capital, RKit ,
for t = 2001, 2002, ..., 2015, plugging reported figures for net income and for book value
of capital in equation 3.2. We denote with R¯Kit (no-crisis return)the return bank i would
have earned in period t on its assets had the 2008 crisis not happened. We compute
this return simply by taking an average of bank return before the crisis, i.e. over the
2001 to 2006 period
R¯kit =
1
6
2006∑
j=2001
Iij
Kij
where t = 2007, 2008, ... .
Figure 3.1 plots the time series for crisis and no-crisis returns to capital, averaged
across all banks in our sample. Note that, during the financial crisis and immediately
after, banks experience a significant drop in average returns. Few years after the crisis
returns are stabilized but, typically, remain below their pre-crisis level. The key object
of study of this methodology are the losses of each bank at the start of the time of the
crisis (t∗), which we define as
Lossi =
K¯Mit∗ −KMit∗
Kit∗
where K¯Mit∗ is the no-crisis market value of capital (i.e. the value of capital of the
bank had the crisis not occurred, or just before the crisis hit) and KMit is the realized
one, i.e. the market value of the bank as the crisis hit and each bank realizes that from
t∗ on it will face lower returns on its capital. Using equation 3.1 it is easy to show that,
Lossi =
∞∑
j=0
(
1
1 + rB
)j
[R¯Ki,t∗+j −RKi,t∗+j ]
i.e. the losses are just the net present value of the difference between the no-
crisis and the crisis returns to capital. Notice though that in order to measure losses
for each bank two steps are necessary. The first is to obtain a measure of rB i.e. the
discount factor of banks, the second is to obtain a measure for the realized returns
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Figure 3.1: Average Actual, and Counterfactual Rate of Return to Capital
to capital after 2015. We calibrate rB so that the pre-crisis, average market to book
ratio
K¯Mit
Kit
=
∑∞
j=0
(
1
1+rB
)j
R¯Kit+j implied by equation 3.1 matches the average market
to book value of capital for the banks in our sample in 2006, which is equal to 2.02.
This procedure yields a value of rB = 7%. Regarding the post 2015 returns to capital,
Figure 3.1 shows that the average return to capital do not seem to be returning to
the no-crisis level. The returns are still depressed several years after the recession for
two reasons. First, banks are still suffering the consequences of the recession. Second,
stricter regulations in the banking sector do not allow banks to become as leveraged
and as a result banks cannot be as profitable as they were before the crisis. For the
purpose of our question (i.e. how big are the losses faced by bank during crises) this
distiction is not essential, and moreover, given the high estimate of the bank discount
factor rB, estimated of losses are not very sensitive to different assumptions regarding
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post 2016 returns to capital.2 For these reasons we simply assume that from 2016 on
RKit+j = R¯
K
it+j ,i.e. that returns to bank capital will go back to their pre-crisis level. In
the appendix we show how our key results change when we assume that bank losses are
more persistent and, at the same time, banks use a lower discount factor.
The dark bars in Figure ?? below represent the histogram of the losses experienced
by all the 25 banks in our sample. Notice how a quite a few bank holding institutions
experienced losses that surpassed their book value of capital. We believe this evidence
helps to understand why a bailout of the US financial system was indeed carried out in
2008.
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Figure 3.2: Histogram of losses experienced by major US banks
In the next section we will move on to analyze how a stricter capital requirement
2 We believe though that it would be a very useful exercise to asses how much of the losses suffered
by banks during the crisises were due to the anticipation of future regulation.
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would have altered the size and the distribution of these losses acriss these banks.
3.3.2 Capital Requirements
The object of study in this methodology will be the losses defined as follows,
define no crisis and crisis returns conditional on theta We use the realized return to
capital, IitKit , to compute R˜
K
it+j and R
K
it+j in the way described above and these in turn
are used to compute lossi. Capital requirements will impact the realized return to
capital, IitKit , and as a result will alter lossi. To see how capital requirements affect this
return consider the return rewritten as follows,
Iit
Kit
=
RAitAit − rLit
Ait − Lit (3.3)
where RAit is the return on assests and r is the interest rate payment on liabilities. We
will think of changes in the capital requirement as a reshuﬄing of capital and liabilities
in a way that leaves assets unaffected. In particular, for capital requirement θ% the
new liabilities will be,
Lreqit (θ) = min{Lit, (1− θ)Ait}
A θ% capital requirement implies that liabilities have to be less than (1− θ)% of assets.
Then the return to capital with the new requirement will be,
RAitAit − rLreqit (θ)
Ait − Lreqit (θ)
There are two important things to notice here. First, if the bank is very well capitalized
then a change in θ will not affect the return to capital at all. This is because the
bank is already satisfying the capital requirement. Second, suppose that the capital
requirement is actually binding for a bank. Increasing the requirement increases the
returns to capital when RAit > r and decreases it when the converse is true. Therefore,
stricter capital requirements will imply that banks are more profitable in bad times and
less profitable in good times, i.e. are hit less hard by the crisis but are not able to make
as much profits outside of the crisis. This intuition can be seen in figure 3.3
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Figure 3.3: Impact of Stricter Capital Requirement on Rate of Return to Capital
3.3.3 Calibrating Free Parameters
There are three free parameters in this exercise that we have to pin down, r, rB, and
RAit . We take the interest payment to liabilities, r, to be 2%. Finally, R
A
it is easily pinned
down from equation 3.3 using the net income, capital and liabilities from the balance
sheets, and specifying r as noted above.
3.3.4 Losses
The evidence also suggests that that raising capital requirements might have a significant
impact on the likelihood of future bailouts. In order to assess more precisely how much a
higher capital requirement is going to affect the probability of a bailout, conditional on a
banking crisis like the one of 2008 happening again, we first define θ¯ to be an alternative
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capital requirement and then define p(θ¯) to be the probability of a bailout conditional
on a crisis happening when the minimum capital requirement is θ¯. We compute p(θ¯) as
p(θ¯) =
∑
i Li(θ¯)∑
i Li(θ = 0)
(3.4)
The numerator of expression 3.4 is the losses of banks with the capital requirement
being θ¯ and the denominator is the realized losses of banks during the crisis. Notice that
when θ¯ = 0, p(θ¯) = 1 i.e. if there is no minimum capital requirement, then, conditional
on having a crisis like the one we experienced in 2008, bailout would happen for sure.
As θ¯ increases, the losses are reduced and the probability of bailout p(θ¯) falls. In the
limit, for θ¯ sufficiently large, the numerator goes to 0 and so does p(θ¯), so no bailout
would be necessary, even in a crisis.
Notice that underlying the derivation of equation 3.4 there is the assumption
that banks do not systematically alter their behavior when they face an alternative
minimum capital requirement. In particular we assume that that they do not change
the value of the assets they hold, that they will receive the same income stream, and
that they keep the same risk profile in their assets; in other words we assume that banks
satisfy the capital requirement simply by substituting from liabilities with capital. These
assumptions are potentially important and non realistic simplification; nevertheless we
believe our exercise represents a necessary first step, in quantify the effectiveness of
higher capital requirement.
In figure 3.4 we show how the probability of at least one bailout happening over the
next 100 years varies with the minimum capital ratio target. The conclusion from this
picture is that moderate increase (the current plan) in the minimum capital requirements
would not be very effective in increasing the resiliency of the US financial institutions.
The reason for this result is that in the 2008 crisis we observe that the majority of bank
capital is in banks which experienced losses exceeding 20% (see figure ?? above), so a
moderately larger capital ratio would just not be enough to substantially reduce the
fraction of assets in trouble. Instead a more substantial increase in capital requirements
would increase substantially the fraction of bank assets that are in banks which have
enough capital to cover their losses, and thus it can achieve a more substantial reduction
in the chance of a bailout.
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Figure 3.4: Capital Ratios and Probability of Bailout in the next 100 years: method 1
3.4 Using stock market data
In this section we conduct a similar exercise to the one in section 3, using stock market
and balance sheet data for the set of 26 government backed large financial institutions
which include the 18 bank holding companies that participated in the 2013 Fed stress
tests plus the 8 financial institutions that were hard hit by the 2008 crisis (see the full
list in the appendix). The same group of bank holding companies was used in Atkeson
et al. (2014).
3.4.1 Distance to insolvency
The key relations used for our analysis are equations 3.5 and 3.6 below (see Atkeson et
al. 2014 for a formal derivation)
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VKit = VAit − VLit (3.5)
log
(
1
σKit
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Distance to
Insolvency
= log
(
VKit
VAit
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Capital/Asset
Ratio
+ log
(
1
σAit
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Asset safety
(3.6)
Equation 3.5 simply states that the market value of the capital of bank i in
period t, VKt, is given by the value of its assets VAit minus the value of its liabilities
VLit. Equation 3.6 relates a measure of financial soundness of the bank, i.e., distance to
insolvency, to two factors. Fist, is the ratio of the value of bank capital to the value of
its assets, i.e., its leverage. This is related to the financial soundness of the bank since
the less leveraged the bank is, i.e., the smaller a fraction of total assets liabilities are, the
less likely it is that the bank will be unable to pay its liabilities. The second, denoted
asset safety, is the reciprocal of the riskiness of the banks assets, i.e., σAit . The riskier
a banks assets are, i.e., the higher σAit is, the more likely it is that the banks returns
are not large enough to pay for liabilities, resulting to a shorter distance to insolvency.
Distance to insolvency, i.e., the term on the left hand side of equation 3.6, can
be estimated using stock market return data for the bank holding companies. We use
data from the CRSP database on daily returns to capital to construct this measure of
variance in monthly returns. To make things concrete in figure 3.5 below we plot the
log of the median distance to insolvency for all the institutions in our sample. As has
been been shown in the literature a distance to insolvency below zero is an indication
of high vulnerability, i.e. that the institution is on the verge of insolvency. The plot
shows how the bulk of the US financial institutions during the financial crisis of 2008
were indeed on the verge of insolvency.
We have shown that distance to insolvency can be measured directly from the the
data. The next object in equation 3.6 that we calculate is the ratio of bank capital to
bank assets. We measure the value of equity of a bank holding company as the total
market capitalization, as reported in CRSP. The value of liabilities for these companies
we get from COMPUSTAT. Using these measures we can now calculate the capital asset
ratio of a bank. The only unknown left in equation 3.6 is asset safety 1σAit
, that we can
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Figure 3.5: Median Distance to Insolvency
now back out.
3.4.2 A counterfactual exercise
The exercise of backing out the asset safety enables us to conduct our key counterfactual
exercise. That is, we can now evaluate how the soundness of financial institutions would
have changed, during a crisis, had the US implemented regulations that forced banks
to have higher capital requirements. We compute log distance to insolvency, for a
counterfactual capital to asset ratio θ¯ for each bank-holding company in our sample, i.e.
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DICFit (θ¯), using equation 3.6
DICFit (θ¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Log distance to
Insolvency (CF)
= log
(
max(
VKit
VAit
, θ¯)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Capital/Asset
Ratio (CF)
+ log
(
1
σAit
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Asset safety (Data)
(3.7)
Once we have counterfactual distance to insolvency for each institution in each
period, as the function of the capital ratio, we can derive a relation similar to the one
derived in figure 3.4 above. In particular for any minimum capital requirement θ¯ we can
relate distance to insolvency to probability of bailout p(θ¯) simply using the following
formula
p(θ¯) =
DIDataMed
DICFMed(θ¯)
(3.8)
where DIDataMed is the median distance to insolvency in the data computed in the
months of the financial crisis (September 2008 through April 2009) and DICFMed(θ¯) is
the same measure computed under counterfactual (higher) capital requirement. Notice
that if θ¯ generates the same distance to default as in the data during the crisis, then
the probability of bailout (conditional on the crisis) will be equal to 1. As higher and
higher counterfactual capital requirements are imposed, the counterfactual distance to
insolvency becomes larger and the probability of bailout falls. The logic once again is
that higher capital requirements make bank more able to withstand losses and hence,
conditional on a crisis happening, more banks are less likely to need public support.
Figure 3.6 plots how this probability of bailout over the next 100 years changes as we
increase the minimum capital requirement for all the institutions in our sample. The
blue line represents the probability computed stock prices (the methodology outlined
in this section), while the red line is the same line plotted in figure 3.4. The x-axis
reports the average capital to asset ratio that would emerge in our economy under a
given counterfactual minimum capital ratio θ¯. Overall this figure suggests a modest
increase in capital requirement (say up to 12%) would achieve a moderate (around 10
percentage points) reduction in the probability of bailout. On the other hand a more
aggressive increase (like the one advocated by the Minneapolis Fed report) would achieve
reductions in bailout probability that are significantly more substantial and as large as
50 percentage points.
67
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0 10 20 30 40 50
A
xi
s 
Ti
tl
e 
Axis Title 
Figure 3.6: Capital Ratios and Probability of Bailout in the next 100 years: method 2
3.5 Supporting Evidence
In this final section we present some more direct evidence supporting our general claim
that a higher capital to asset ratio would make banks safer. This evidence supports our
view that, forcing financial institutions to hold more capital will make them resilient,
should another big shock like the 2008 financial crisis hit.
We start with data used in the first methodology. In figure 3.7 each dot represents
a bank from the first sample. On the x axis is the capital to asset ratio for the bank in
2005, before the crisis hit. The y axis reports the loss of the same bank as a fraction
of its initial capital (as computed in Section 3.3). The figure shows a negative relation
between the two, i.e. banks that were more capitalized before the crisis hit ended
up suffering smaller losses during the crisis. The two lines represent the estimated
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relationship (using standard OLS and quantile regressions) between the losses and the
log of the capital ratio. The magnitude of the relation is economically significant. In
particular the first two columns of table 1 show the result of regressing losses on 2005 log
capital ratio. The coefficient of that regression (depending on the estimation method)
is between 0.7 and 1, showing that, for example, a modest increase in the 2005 capital
ratio from 0.08 to 0.1 is associated with a reduction in losses between 15% and 20%.
As the R2 of the OLS regression and the standard errors of the estimated coefficients
the statistical significance of the relation is not overly strong. One possible reason for
this is that in order to compute the losses we had to restrict our sample to banks that
survived the crisis, therefore biasing the result against finding an effect of capital in
reducing losses. Another reason for the weakness of the relationship that government
intervention (more likely for banks that were poorly capitalized) tempered the realized
losses.
Table 1. Capital ratios in 2005 and crisis outcomes
Methodology 1 Methodology 2
Indep. variable: Losses (% of Capital) Log Dist. to Insolv.
Regression method: OLS QREG OLS QREG
Log (Cap Ratio) -0.68 -1.09* 0.37*** 0.44***
(0.40) (0.53) (0.10) (0.00)
Observations 25 25 25 25
R2 0.11 0.38
Note: All regressions include a constant. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, * p<0.1
The second methodology uses the distance to insolvency as a measure of bank
risk. The distance to insolvency is constructed using information on investor’s beliefs
of the risk faced by banks, through bank prices. As a result, we do not need post-crisis
information in order to compute losses and thus our sample includes financial institu-
tions that did not survive the crisis and its aftermath, such as Wachovia corporation
or Washington Mutual. Moreover government bailouts play a smaller role on observed
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Figure 3.7: Capital Asset Ratios and Losses (Measure 1)
losses, as the effects of bailouts took some time to manifest, For these reasons we think
that the relation between pre-crisis capitalization and crisis losses is measured more
accurately using data from our second methodology. In figure 3.8 each dot is an institu-
tion in our sample. The x axis represents the capital to asset ratio for that institution
in 2005 (i.e. the ratio
VKit
VKit+VLit
) while the y axis reports the average distance to insol-
vency for that institution during the crisis (September 2008 through April 2009). As
we expected institutions that were better capitalized before the crisis had, on average,
better outcomes (i.e. were farther away from insolvency) during the crisis. As in the
previous case the two lines represent the estimated relationship (using standard OLS
and quantile regressions) between the log of the distance to insolvency and the log of
the capital ratio. The coefficient of the regressions are in this case strongly statistically
significant. Their size (depending on the estimation method) is between 0.35 and 0.45,
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Figure 3.8: Capital Asset Ratios and Distance to Insolvency
showing that, for example, a modest increase in the 2005 capital ratio from 0.08 to 0.1
is associated with a reduction in the distance to insolvency between 7% and 9%.
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3.6 Conclusions
The study argues that higher capital requirements can be effective in improving the
resilience of large financial institutions to adverse shocks to their assets, such as the
2008 crisis. Using a very simple model of large banks we show that higher capital
requirement reduce the impact of crisis through two channels: first they force banks
to hold more of their own resources in order to cover their losses, second by forcing
banks to take on less leverage they reduce the risk they face. This implies with higher
capital requirement a financial crisis would not necessarily put many large financial
institutions at risk of insolvency, and thus the probability that a crisis would require a
public bailout can decrease significantly. We find that increasing capital requirement,
say, from 10% to 20%, can reduce the probability of a public bailout in the next 100
yeas from over 80% to, depending on the methodology, 45% to 60%. We corroborate
these findings by also showing that financial institutions that were better capitalized in
2005 experienced lower losses during the crisis and higher distance to insolvency. The
study has not explored the effects that higher capital requirement would have on bank
choices regarding the riskiness of their project, and it has not studied the costs of higher
capital requirements. We view these two issues as important and complementary to our
findings.
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Appendix A
Consequences of the
Lending-into-Arrears IMF Policy
Shift
Theorem 1
The price schedule, qM , I will be considering is
qM (Vρ,B, B
′
S) =
1 if B ∈ S,B′S ∈ ¯B(BS +BA, Vρ)0 otherwise
Where
¯
B(B, Vρ) is defined as,
¯
B(B, Vρ) = {Bˆ ∈ [0, B¯]|u(y + Bˆ − (1 + r)B) + βu(y − rBˆ)
1− β ≥ Vρ}
I conjecture, and proceed to verify, that the following is the value function,
W˜ (Vρ,B) =

u(y−r(BA+BS))
1−β if B ∈ S
Vρ otherwise
Given the above there are two things to show. First, the sovereign’s value function,
W , corresponds to the conjectured value function, i.e., W = W˜ . Second, the price
schedule satisfies the no arbitrage condition of the lender’s,
qM (Vρ,B, B
′
S) = z(Vρ,B,B
′)EV ′ρ |Vρz
∗(V ′ρ,B
′)
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where, B′ = (B′S , B
′
A = 0).
Sovereign
Let B ∈ S. Given the guesses, value of repayment,
VR(Vρ,B, B
′
S) =
u(y +B′S − (1 + r)(BS +BA)) + β u(y−rB
′
S)
1−β if B
′
S ∈ ¯B(BS +BA, Vρ)
u(y − (1 + r)(BS +BA)) + β u(y−rB
′
S)
1−β if B
′
S ∈ ¯B(BS +BA, Vρ)
c ∩ [0, B¯]
u(y − (1 + r)(BS +BA)) + βVρ otherwise
Let B′S < B¯, then B
′ = (B′S , B
′
A = 0) ∈ S, implying that,
u(y +B′S − (1 + r)(BS +BA)) + β
u(y − rB′S)
1− β ≥
≥ u(y − (1 + r)(BS +BA)) + βVρ
Therefore, the sovereign never chooses to borrow outside of the safe zone. The
function
u(y +B′S − (1 + r)(BS +BA)) + β
u(y − rB′S)
1− β (A.1)
has a maximum at B′S = BS + BA. Since, B ∈ S it follows that B′ = (B′S = BS +
BA, B
′
A = 0) ∈ S. Further, B′S = BS + BA ∈ ¯B(BS + BA) since at B
′
S equation A.1
equals u(y−r(BS+BA))1−β ≥ V¯ρ by definition of the safe zone.
The sovereign, at the auction stage solves the following,
W (Vρ,B) = max{B′S ,θ∈{0,1}}(1− θ)Vρ + θVR(Vρ,B, B
′
S) (A.2)
At B′S = BS + BA, VR(Vρ,B, B
′
S) =
u(y−r(BS+BA))
1−β ≥ Vρ by definition of the safe zone,
for either Vρ. Therefore, for B ∈ S,
W (Vρ,B) =
u(y − r(BS +BA))
1− β = W˜ (Vρ,B)
Let B /∈ S. Given the guesses, value of repayment,
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VR(Vρ,B, B
′
S) =
u(y − (1 + r)(BS +BA)) + β
u(y−rB′S)
1−β if B
′
S ∈ [0, B¯]
u(y − (1 + r)(BS +BA)) + βVρ otherwise
The maximum of this function is achieved at, B′S = 0 and it is u(y−(1+r)(BS+BA))+
β u(y)1−β .
I now show that the maximum of maxB′S VR(Vρ,B, B
′
S) is in fact smaller than
both Vρ. Then, from equation A.2 it follows that W (Vρ,B) = Vρ if B /∈ S concluding
the sovereigns side of the problem. Since, B /∈ S the following inequality holds,
u(y − r(BS +BA))
1− β < V¯ρ
It is easy to see that the following is also true1,
u(y − (1 + r)(BS +BA)) + β u(y)
1− β <
u(y − r(BS +BA))
1− β
Implying that,
u(y − (1 + r)(BS +BA)) + β u(y)
1− β < V¯ρ
Proving the result for the low default cost. The inequality for the high default cost
follows directly from the definition of
¯
Vρ in the statement of the theorem.
Lenders
From the above it follows that,
B′(Vρ,B) =
(B′S = BS +BA, B′A = 0) if B ∈ S(B′S = 0, B′A = 0) otherwise
and this implies that
z∗(Vρ,B) =
1 if B ∈ S0 otherwise
1 The following function is maximized at B′S = BS +BA,
u(y +B′S − r(BS +BA)) + β u(y − rB
′
S)
1− β
as was discussed above. Then, the value of this function at B′S = 0 must be smaller
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As discussed above I now have to show that,
qM (Vρ,B, B
′
S) = z(Vρ,B,B
′)EV ′ρ |Vρz
∗(V ′ρ,B
′)
or more precisely,
z(Vρ,B,B
′)EV ′ρ |Vρz
∗(V ′ρ,B
′) =
1 if B ∈ S, and B′S ∈ ¯B(BS +BA, Vρ)0 otherwise
where, B′ = (B′S , B
′
A = 0).
• B /∈ S: As argued above if B /∈ S then VR < Vρ independently of B′. Therefore,
z(Vρ,B,B
′) = 0 if B /∈ S for any B′.
• B′ /∈ S: z∗(Vρ,B) = 0 as long as B /∈ S implying that even if B ∈ S if B′ /∈ S
then z(Vρ,B,B
′)EV ′ρ |Vρz
∗(V ′ρ,B′) = 0
• B ∈ S,B′S ∈ ¯B(BS+BA, Vρ): Clearly, z
∗(V ′ρ,B′) = 1 for both V ′ρ and by definition
of
¯
B(BS +BA, Vρ)
VR(Vρ,B, B
′
S) = u(y +B
′
S − (1 + r)(BS +BA)) + β
u(y − rB′S)
1− β ≥ Vρ
implying z(Vρ,B,B
′) = 1.
• B ∈ S,B′S ∈ ¯B(BS +BA, Vρ)
c ∩ [0, B¯]: Here I argue that z = 0.
VR(Vρ,B, B
′
S) = u(y − (1 + r)(BS +BA)) + β
u(y − rB′S)
1− β <
< u(y +B′S − (1 + r)(BS +BA)) + β
u(y − rB′S)
1− β < Vρ
Where the last inequality follows from the fact that B′S ∈ ¯B(BS +BA, Vρ)
c. And
this concludes the proof.
Preliminary results and notation
I show that the IMF problem can be written as,
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X˜(BS , BA, T ) = max
{{BI,t}Tt=1},{ct}T−1t=0 }
T−1∑
t=0
βt(1− λ)tu(ct)
+
T−1∑
t=1
λ(1− λ)t−1βtV¯ρ + (1− λ)T−1βT u(y − r(BI,T +BA))
1− β
s.t.
c0 + (1 + r)BS + rBA = y + (1− λ)BI,1
ct + (1 + r)BI,t + rBA = y + (1− λ)BI,t+1 t = 1, 2, ..., T − 2
cT−1 + (1 + r)BI,T−1 + rBA = y +BI,T
BI,T +BA ≤ B¯
ct ≥ 0 BI,t+1 ≥ 0 t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1
Notice that I have removed the BI,t + BA > B¯ constraint. I will illustrate that
this constraint does not bind. From the first order conditions I get, c¯ = ct−1 = ct for
t = 1, 2, ..., T − 1.
Lemma 1. In the X˜ problem BI,T +BA = B¯
Proof. Assume not, then BI,T + BA < B¯ so I can take first order conditions without
consideration of the BI,T + BA ≤ B¯ constraint. This implies that, c¯ = cT−1 = y −
r(BI,T +BA). Summing the constraints up to T − 1 I get,
T−1∑
t=0
(
1− λ
1 + r
)t
(y − ct − rBA) +
(
1− λ
1 + r
)T−1
BI,T = (1 + r)BS ⇒
⇒
T−1∑
t=0
(
1− λ
1 + r
)t
rBI,T +
(
1− λ
1 + r
)T−1
BI,T = (1 + r)BS ⇒
⇒ BI,T = (1 + r)∑T−1
t=0
(
1−λ
1+r
)t
r +
(
1−λ
1+r
)T−1BS > BS
The last inequality follows after some algebra. This implies that, BI,T+BA > BS+BA >
B¯ where the last inequality follows from the fact that the IMF program takes place
outside of the safe zone. This is a contradiction to BI,T +BA < B¯
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Lemma 2. In the X˜ problem BI,t−1 < BI,t for t = 2, 3, ..., T
Proof. Starting with BI,T < BI,T−1 the previous argument implies that cT−1 < cT , and
this directly implies BI,T < BI,T−1. Using this inequality and the fact that cT−2 = cT−1
I can show that BI,T−1 < BI,T−2. In general, assume BI,t+1 < BI,t then since ct = ct−1
I get,
(1 + r)BI,t − (1 + r)BI,t−1 = (1− λ)BI,t+1 − (1− λ)BI,t < 0
and this implies that BI,t < BI,t−1. Since, BI,T = B¯ −BA it follows that BI,t−1 < BI,t
for t = 2, 3, ..., T
Therefore, X˜ = X. Summing the budget constraints and after some algebra, the
T − 1 period budget constraint is,
T−1∑
t=0
(
1− λ
1 + r
)t
(y − c) = (1 + r)BS +
T−1∑
t=0
(
1− λ
1 + r
)t
rBA −
(
1− λ
1 + r
)T−1
(B¯ −BA)
Result 1
Define the following budget set
Γ(T,B) =
(BI,T , {ct}T−1t=0 )
∣∣∣∣
T−1∑
t=0
β˜t(y − ct) = (1 + r)BS +
T−1∑
t=0
β˜trBA − β˜T−1BI,T
BI,T +BA ≤ B¯, ct ≥ 0, BI,T ≥ 0

(A.3)
For T ≥ 1, define value of the sovereign, who consumes {ct}T−1t=0 for the first T − 1
periods, unless, with probability λ, it moves to continuation value V¯ρ, and after that
consumes u(y − r(BI,T +BA) indefinitely, as,
W (B, T, BI,T , {ct}T−1t=0 ) =
T−1∑
t=0
β˜tu(ct) +
T−1∑
t=1
λβ˜t
1− λV¯ρ +
β˜T
1− λ
(
u(y − r(BI,T +BA))
1− β
)
Then for T > 1 problem X can be rewritten as,
X(B, T ) = max
{BI,1,c}
max
(BI,T ,{ct}T−2t=0 )∈Γ(T−1,B′)
u(c)+
+β(1− λ)W (B′, T − 1, BI,T , {ct}T−2t=0 ) + βλV¯ρ s.t.
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c = y + (1− λ)BI,1 − (1 + r)BS − rBA
This is a slight rewritting of the X problem intended to allign this problem to the
recursive furmulation, and will be used in theorem 2.
Theorem 2
The price and the value functions are now:
qM (Vρ,B, B
′
S) =

1 if B ∈ S,B′S ∈ ¯B(BS +BA, Vρ)
1− λ if B ∈ S,B′S ∈ B¯(BS +BA) and Vρ = ¯Vρ
0 otherwise
Where
¯
B(B) is defined as,
¯
B(B, Vρ) = {B˜ ∈ [0, B¯]|u(y + B˜ − (1 + r)B) + βu(y − rB˜)
1− β ≥ Vρ}
and B¯(B) is defined as,
B¯(B) = {B′S |u(y+(1−λ)B′S−(1+r)B)+βλmax
T
X(B′, T )+β(1−λ)V¯ρ ≥
¯
Vρ, B
′ ∈ Ip}
where B′ = (B′S , B
′
A = 0). The IMF price schedule is,
qI(Vρ,B, B
′
S) =

1 if B ∈ Ip,B′ ∈ S
1− λ if B ∈ Ip,B′ ∈ Ip and Vρ =
¯
Vρ
0 otherwise
where B′ = (B′S , B
′
A = BA)
W˜ (Vρ,B) =

u(y−r(BS+BA))
1−β if B ∈ S
maxT X(B, T ) if B ∈ Ip and Vρ =
¯
Vρ
Vρ otherwise
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Sovereign
Starting with any B ∈ S let B˜ = BS +BA2,
VR(Vρ,B, B
′
S) =
u(y +B′S − (1 + r)B˜) + β u(y−rB
′
S)
1−β B
′
S ∈ ¯B(B˜, Vρ)
u(y − (1 + r)B˜) + β u(y−rB′S)1−β B′S ∈ ¯B(B˜, Vρ)
c ∩ [0, B¯]
u(c˜) + β(1− λ) maxT X(B′, T ) + βλV¯ρ B′S ∈ B¯(B˜) and Vρ = ¯Vρ
u(y − (1 + r)B˜) + β(1− λ) maxT X(B′, T ) + βλV¯ρ B′S ∈ B¯(B˜)c ∩ Ip and Vρ = ¯Vρ
u(y − (1 + r)B˜) + βV¯ρ B′S > B¯ and Vρ = V¯ρ
u(y − (1 + r)B˜) + β(1− λ)
¯
Vρ + βλV¯ρ otherwise
where, c˜ = y + (1− λ)B′S − (1 + r)B˜, and B′ = (B′S , B′A = 0)
Exactly as in the proof of theorem 1 it is easy to show that for B′S ∈ [0, B¯] the
maximum is achieved at B′S = B˜.
I now compare this maximum to the value of leaving the safe zone. Let B′S > B¯
and B′ = (B′S , B
′
A = 0), then,
u(y − (1 + r)B˜) + β(1− λ) max
T≥1
X(B′, T ) + βλV¯ρ <
u(y + (1− λ)B′S − (1 + r)B˜) + β(1− λ) max
T≥1
X(B′, T ) + βλV¯ρ <
max
T≥1
u(y + (1− λ)B′S − (1 + r)B˜)
+β(1− λ) max
(BI,T ,{ct}T−1t=0 )∈Γ(T,B′)
W (B′, T, BI,T , {ct}T−1t=0 ) + βλV¯ρ =
= max
T≥1
max
(BI,T ,{ct}T−1t=0 )∈Γ(T,B′)
u(y + (1− λ)B′S − (1 + r)B˜)+
β(1− λ)W (B′, T, BI,T , {ct}T−1t=0 ) + βλV¯ρ ≤
≤ max
T≥1
max
B′S
max
(BI,T ,{ct}T−1t=0 )∈Γ(T,B′)
u(y + (1− λ)B′S − (1 + r)B˜)+
β(1− λ)W (B′, T, BI,T , {ct}T−1t=0 )
2 In what follows I abuse notation in B′S ∈ ¯B(B˜)
c∩S, and B′S ∈ B¯(B˜)c∩Ip. The reason is that S and
Ip are defined over vectors B. Formally, in the first: B
′
S ∈ ¯B(B˜)
c and B′ ∈ S where B′ = (B′S , B′A = 0)
and similarly for the second.
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+βλV¯ρ =
= max
T≥1
X(B, T + 1) ≤ max
T≥1
X(B, T ) = X(B, T = 1) =
u(y − rB˜)
1− β
where B′ = (B′S , B
′
A = 0), and maxT≥1X(B, T ) = X(B, T = 1) follows from the
preliminary results since B ∈ S
The following is also true for B ∈ S,
u(y − (1 + r)B˜) + βVρ ≤ u(y − (1 + r)B˜) + βu(y − rB¯)
1− β <
< u(y − rB˜) + βu(y − rB˜)
1− β <
u(y − rB˜)
1− β
These inequalities imply that B′S = B˜ is the maximum to the VR(Vρ,B, B
′
S) function
for B ∈ S.
The sovereign may also ask for help. The problem the sovereign faces in this case
is:
Vh(Vρ,B) = max
B′S ,B
′
A=BA
u(c) + βEV ′ρ |VρW˜ (V
′
ρ,B
′) s.t.
c = y − (1 + r)BS − rBA
where qI = 0 since B ∈ S. W˜ is decreasing in debt, so the sovereign sets B′S = 0.
The following shows that for
Vh(Vρ,B) = u(y − (1 + r)BS − rBA) + βu(y − rBA)
1− β =
= u(y˜ − (1 + r)BS) + β u(y˜)
1− β <
u(y˜ − rBS)
1− β =
3
=
u(y − r(BS +BA))
1− β = VR(Vρ,B)
Therefore the sovereign does not ask for help in S
3 The inequality here was show in theorem 1 and it follows from the fact that
u(y˜ + x− (1 + r)BS) + β u(y˜ − rx)
1− β
achieves its maximum at x = BS .
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I now show that for B /∈ S and Vρ = V¯ρ, the sovereign always defaults. Again,
B˜ = BS +BA,
VR(Vρ,B, B
′
S) =
u(y − (1 + r)B˜) + β u(y−rB′S)1−β if B′ ∈ S
u(y − (1 + r)B˜) + βλmaxT X(B′, T ) + β(1− λ)V¯ρ if B′ ∈ Ip, and Vρ =
¯
Vρ
u(y − (1 + r)B˜) + βV¯ρ if B′S > B¯ and Vρ = V¯ρ
u(y − (1 + r)B˜) + β(1− λ)
¯
Vρ + βλV¯ρ otherwise
where, B′ = (B′S , B
′
A = 0). Since, all continuation values are decreasing in debt the
maximum of VR is achieved at B
′
S = 0. Using the same exact argument as in theorem
1 it follows that VR(Vρ,B, B
′
S) < Vρ for either Vρ and,
Vnh(Vρ,B) = maxB′,θ∈{0,1}(1− θ)Vρ + θVR(Vρ,B, B′S) = Vρ
I now show that asking for help is worse than defaulting when B /∈ S and Vρ = V¯ρ.
The objective function of asking for help, Vh(Vρ,B) = maxB′Sf(Vρ,B, B
′
S), is as follows,
f(Vρ,B, B
′
S) =
u(y +B′S − (1 + r)BS − rBA) + β
u(y−rB′S−rBA)
1−β if B
′ ∈ S
u(y − (1 + r)BS − rBA) + βV¯ρ if B′ /∈ S
where, B′ = (B′S , B
′
A = BA). In the boundary of the safe region B
′
S +BA = B¯. Then,
Vh(Vρ,B) ≤ f(Vρ,B, B¯ −BA) = u(y + B¯ − (1 + r)(BS +BA)) + βu(y − rB¯)
1− β <
< u(y + B¯ − (1 + r)B¯) + βu(y − rB¯)
1− β =
u(y − rB¯)
1− β = V¯ρ = Vnh(Vρ,B)
where the first inequality follows from B /∈ S. Therefore, if B /∈ S and Vρ = V¯ρ the
sovereign does not ask for help and defaults.
Here, I show that Vh(
¯
Vρ,B) = maxT X(B, T ). I start with the following inequal-
ity, Vh(
¯
Vρ,B) ≤ maxT X(B, T ). Let the solution to the Vh problem be B¯′S .
fB(B
′
S) =

u(y +B′S − (1 + r)BS − rBA) + β u(y−r(B
′
S+BA))
1−β if B
′ ∈ S
u(c˜) + β(1− λ) maxT X(B′, T ) + βλV¯ρ if B′ ∈ Ip
u(y − (1 + r)BS − rBA) + β(1− λ)
¯
Vρ + βλV¯ρ otherwise
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where, c˜ = y + (1− λ)B′S − (1 + r)BS − rBA, and B′ = (B′S , B′A = BA). The following
is true,
Vh(
¯
Vρ,B) = maxB′SfB(B
′
S)
Since by definition in Ip, X(B
′, T ) ≥
¯
Vρ, it easily follows that the sovereign never
chooses B′S such that B
′ /∈ S ∪ Ip.
I now show that maxT X(B, T ) ≥ fB(B′S) when B′ ∈ S. Consider X(B, T = 1)
X(B, 1) = max
BI,T≤B¯−BA
u(y +BI,T − (1 + r)BS − rBA) + β
(
u(y − r(BI,T +BA))
1− β
)
The constraint onBI,T guarantees thatB
′ ∈ S. This implies that maxT X(B, T ) ≥
fB(B
′
S) when the resulting B
′ ∈ S.
To show that Vh(
¯
Vρ,B) ≤ maxT X(B, T ) it remains to be shown that
max
T
X(B, T ) ≥ fB(B′S)
when the resulting B′ ∈ Ip. Consider such a B′S then,
fB(B
′
S) = u(y + (1− λ)B′S − (1 + r)B˜) + β(1− λ) max
T≥1
X(B′, T ) + βλV¯ρ <
max
T≥1
u(y + (1− λ)B′S − (1 + r)B˜)+
β(1− λ) max
(BI,T ,{ct}T−1t=0 )∈Γ(T,B′)
W (B′, T, BI,T , {ct}T−1t=0 ) + βλV¯ρ =
= max
T≥1
max
(BI,T ,{ct}T−1t=0 )∈Γ(T,B′)
u(y + (1− λ)B′S − (1 + r)B˜)+
β(1− λ)W (B′, T, BI,T , {ct}T−1t=0 ) + βλV¯ρ ≤
≤ max
T≥1
max
B′S
max
(BI,T ,{ct}T−1t=0 )∈Γ(T,B′)
u(y + (1− λ)B′S − (1 + r)B˜)+
β(1− λ)W (B′, T, BI,T , {ct}T−1t=0 ) + βλV¯ρ =
= max
T≥1
X(B, T + 1) ≤ max
T≥1
X(B, T )
where, B′ = (B′S , B
′
A = BA). Therefore, Vh(¯
Vρ,B) = maxB′S fB(B
′
S) ≤ maxT X(B, T ).
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Let B∗S be the borrowing in the first period in the X program. As discussed in the
preliminary results section as long as T > 1 this B∗S result to a B
′ = (B′S = B
∗
S , B
′
A =
BA) ∈ Ip.
X(B, T ) = max
(BI,T ,{ct}T−2t=0 )∈Γ(T,B′)
u(y + (1− λ)B∗S − (1 + r)B˜)+
β(1− λ)W (B′, T − 1, BI,T , {ct}T−2t=0 ) + βλV¯ρ =
= u(y + (1− λ)B∗S − (1 + r)B˜)+
β(1− λ) max
(BI,T ,{ct}T−2t=0 )∈Γ(T,B′)
W (B′, T − 1, BI,T , {ct}T−2t=0 ) + βλV¯ρ ≤
= u(y + (1− λ)B∗S − (1 + r)B˜) + β(1− λ)X(B, T − 1) + βλV¯ρ ≤
= u(y + (1− λ)B∗S − (1 + r)B˜) + β(1− λ) max
T
X(B, T ) + βλV¯ρ ≤
I will prove the other inequality as follows, Vh(
¯
Vρ,B) ≥ X(B, T ) for all T > 0.
Define the following function, the objective function of the X problem,
W (B, T, BI,T , {ct}T−1t=0 ) =
T−1∑
t=0
β˜tu(ct) +
T−1∑
t=1
λβ˜t
1− λV¯ρ +
β˜T
1− λ
(
u(y − r(BI,T +BA))
1− β
)
The X problem can be rewritten as.
X(B, T ) = max
{BI,T ,{ct}T−2t=0 ,BI,1,c}
u(c) + β(1− λ)W (B′, T − 1, BI,T , {ct}T−2t=0 ) + βλV¯ρ s.t.
c = y + (1− λ)BI,1 − (1 + r)BS − rBA
T−2∑
t=0
β˜t(y − ct) = (1 + r)BI,1 +
T−2∑
t=0
β˜trBA − β˜T−2BI,T
BI,T +BA ≤ B¯
Where, B′ = (B′S = BI,1, B
′
A = BA). As shown in the benchmark model for
T > 1, B′ ∈ Ip. Then,
Vh(
¯
Vρ,B) ≥ u(y + (1− λ)B′S − (1 + r)BS − rBA) + β(1− λ) max
T
X(B′, T ) + βλV¯ρ ≥
≥ u(y + (1− λ)B′S − (1 + r)BS − rBA) + β(1− λ)W (B′, T − 1, BI,T , {ct}T−2t=0 ) + βλV¯ρ
The past inequality holds for all B′ ∈ Ip and in particular it holds when the maximum
is chosen over BI,T , {ct}T−2t=0 , BI,1, and c. Therefore, Vh(¯Vρ,B
′) ≥ X(B′, T ) for T > 1.
The T = 1 case is trivial.
87
Lenders
Having solved the problem of the sovereign taking the price schedule as given I now
verify that the price schedule does in fact imply that lenders make zero profits.
z(Vρ,B,B
′)EV ′ρ |Vρ [h(V
′
ρ,B
′) + (1− h(V ′ρ,B′))z∗(V ′ρ,B′)] =
1 if B ∈ S,B′S ∈ ¯B(BS +BA, Vρ)
1− λ if B ∈ S,B′S ∈ B¯(BS +BA)
and Vρ =
¯
Vρ
0 otherwise
For B′ ∈ S, the sovereign does not ask for help, therefore,
z(Vρ,B,B
′)EV ′ρ |Vρz
∗(V ′ρ,B
′) =
1 if B ∈ S,B′S ∈ ¯B(BS +BA, Vρ)0 otherwise
needs to be shown. The behavior of the sovereign in the safe region is identical to
the one in theorem 1, therefore all the proofs for this region can be found there. B ∈ S
differs from the no IMF case in B′S ∈ B¯(BS+BA) and Vρ = ¯Vρ. Since, B¯(BS+BA) ⊆ Ip
the IMF helps in the case that
¯
Vρ remains otherwise the sovereign defaults. Therefore,
EV ′ρ |Vρ [h(V
′
ρ,B
′) + (1− h(V ′ρ,B′))z∗(V ′ρ,B′)] = 1− λ
Additionally, z(Vρ,B,B
′) = 1 since by definition of this region
u(y + (1− λ)B′S − (1 + r)B) + β(1− λ) max
T
X(B′, T ) + βλV¯ρ ≥
¯
Vρ
i.e., the sovereign prefers to repay the current obligations if debt is accumulated to this
region. For B′ /∈ S the arguments are identical to the no IMF case.
IMF
The last thing to check is the price of IMF debt outside of the safe region,
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EV ′ρ |Vρ [h(V
′
ρ,B
′)+(1−h(V ′ρ,B′))z∗(V ′ρ,B′)] =

1 if B /∈ S,B′ ∈ S
1− λ if B /∈ S,B′ ∈ Ip and Vρ =
¯
Vρ
0 otherwise
No off equilibrium behavior needs to be checked here. In the equilibrium path the
sovereign, given these prices, ifB′ ∈ S the sovereign does not ask for help, h(V ′ρ,B′) = 0,
however, does not default under any realization of the cost of default, z∗(V ′ρ,B′) giving
the price of one. In the Ip region the sovereign asks for help if Vρ =
¯
Vρ and does not
if Vρ = V¯ρ. Given, that the current period realization is Vρ =
¯
Vρ, next period the
probability of the state remaining the same is 1−λ while the probability of it changing
is λ giving the expected return of 1−λ. If the state in the current period is Vρ = V¯ρ the
state next period has to be Vρ = V¯ρ and the sovereign always defaults. Finally, outside
of Ip the sovereign always defaults.
Lemma 2
The proof of this Lemma follows directly from the description.
Lemma 3
Part (a) is again obvious, since the sovereign prefers less debt to more. Part (b):
Consider, B˜S + B˜A > B¯. I focus on reschedulings that result in zero arrears. In the
safe region the composition of arrears and maturing debt is irrelevant, while outside of
the safe zone the sovereign defaults if arrears are positive, and by moving debt to the
safe region the lender is better off. Therefore, reschedulings will extinguish arrears. The
rescheduling game then is,
max
BS
V L(BS , 0)
W (
¯
Vρ, BS , 0) ≥ max{
¯
Vρ,W (
¯
Vρ, B˜S + B˜A, 0)}
The lender will not choose a BS that will result in default. Define Bˆ as,
max
T
X(Bˆ, 0, T ) =
¯
Vρ
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then the program becomes,
max
BS≤Bˆ
(1 + r)BS
W (
¯
Vρ, BS , 0) ≥ max{max
T
X(B˜S + B˜A, 0, T ),
¯
Vρ}
Suppose maxT X(B˜S + B˜A, 0, T ) ≥
¯
Vρ then BS = B˜S + B˜A ≤ Bˆ. On the other hand, if
maxT X(B˜S + B˜A, 0, T ) <
¯
Vρ then, BS = Bˆ < B˜S + B˜A. Therefore, BS = min{Bˆ, B˜S +
B˜A}
Lemma 4
As noted after the lemma the main result to prove here is the arrear clearing. Take any
debt level (BS , BA) such that,
max
T
X(BS , BA, T ) ≥
¯
Vρ
Consider the following debt position (BS + γBA, 0) where,
γ =
∑T ∗−1
t=0 β˜
tr + β˜T
∗−1
1 + r
as long as the sovereign does not default it is easy to check that the lender is indifferent
between (BS + γBA, 0) and (BS , BA). Turning to the lender, consumption during the
first T ∗ − 1 periods of the IMF program is given from,
T ∗−1∑
t=0
β˜t(y − c) = (1 + r)BS +
T ∗−1∑
t=0
β˜trBA − β˜T ∗−1(B¯ −BA)
Consider the IMF program at (BS + γBA, 0). One of the choices of the sovereign is T
∗.
If the sovereign were to choose this length for the IMF program consumption would
be identical to the one in (BS , BA). Therefore, the sovereign is at least as well off at
(BS + γBA, 0).
I can therefore focus on reschedulings for which the arrears are cleared. Since the
sovereign can now remain at the initial debt position the lender has to guarantee that
the choice of maturing debt makes the sovereign indifferent between maxT X(Bˆ, 0, T )
and W (
¯
Vρ, B˜S , B˜A). The rest of the argument is similar to the previous lemma. It will
become clear from the next theorem why the option to fully repay the arrears is less
desirable here.
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Theorem 3
Consider the B˜S , B˜A described in the assumptions of the theorem. Since, (B˜S , B˜A) ∈
ILIA it follows that,
W (
¯
Vρ, B˜S , B˜A) = max
T
X(B˜S , B˜A, T )
so in the lending into arrears case maturing debt is chosen such that,
max
T
X(B∗, 0, T ) = max
T
X(B˜S , B˜A, T )
In the no lending into arrears there are two possibilities. The first is,
max
T
X(B˜S + B˜A, 0, T ) ≤
¯
Vρ
Then, the rescheduling outcome in no lending into arrears is,
max
T
X(Bˆ, 0, T ) =
¯
Vρ
But B∗ is clearly less that Bˆ, giving the desired inequality. The second possibility is
max
T
X(B˜S + B˜A, 0, T ) >
¯
Vρ
in which case the rescheduling outcome of lending into arrears is B˜S + B˜A. It now
remains to show that B˜S + B˜A > B
∗. Assume that B∗ = B˜S + B˜A. Then,
max
T
X(B˜S , B˜A, T ) = max
T
X(B˜S + B˜A, 0, T )
A comparison of the lifetime budget constraint for any given T gives,
T−1∑
t=0
β˜t(y − ca) = (1 + r)BS +
T−1∑
t=0
β˜trBA − β˜T−1(B¯ −BA)
for (B˜S , B˜A) and,
T−1∑
t=0
β˜t(y − cb) = (1 + r)BS + (1 + r)BA − β˜T−1B¯
for (B˜S + B˜A, 0). This implies that c
a > cb for T > 1 and ca = cb for T = 1. Therefore,
as long as the solution to maxT X(B˜S + B˜A, 0, T ) has T > 1 the result follows easily.
The fact that the solution to this problem has to feature T > 1 follows from the fact
91
that the solution to maxT X(B˜S , B˜A, T ) has T > 1.
Renormalizing the value function I get,
X(BS , BA, T ) = (1− β˜T )u(cT ) + β˜Tu(y − rB¯)
cT = y − rBA − r + λ
1− β˜T [BS −
β˜T
1− λ(B¯ −BA)]
Lemma 3. If B¯S >
¯
BS then for any BA,
arg max
T
X(B¯S , BA, T ) ≥ arg max
T
X(
¯
BS , BA, T )
Proof. Consider the following problem,
X(x,BS , BA) = (1− x)u(cx) + xu(y − rB¯)
cx = y − rBA − r + λ
1− x [BS −
x
1− λ(B¯ −BA)]
Then,
∂X(x,BS , BA)
∂x
= −u(cx) + (1− x)u′(cx)dcx
dx
+ u(y − rB¯)
and,
dcx
dx
= − r + λ
(1− x)2 [BS −
(B¯ −BA)
1− λ ]
Differentiating this with respect to BS I get,
∂2V (x,BS , BA)
∂x∂BS
= −u′′(cx)(r + λ)
(1− x)
dcx
dx
(A.4)
Suppose
¯
BS < B¯S , and both, BS >
B¯−BA
1−λ , then,
∂V (x,
¯
BS , BA)
∂x
>
∂V (x, B¯S , BA)
∂x
since in this case equation A.4 is strictly negative. Therefore,∫ β˜T
β˜T+k
∂V (t,
¯
BS , BA)
∂x
dt >
∫ β˜T
β˜T+k
∂V (t, B¯S , BA)
∂x
dt
and using the fundamental theorem of calculus,
V (β˜T ,
¯
BS , BA)− V (β˜T+k,
¯
BS , BA) > V (β˜
T , B¯S , BA)− V (β˜T+k, B¯S , BA) (A.5)
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Suppose now that, at (B¯S , BA) the sovereign chooses a shorter program, than at (
¯
BS , BA),
say, T and T + k respectively. Then,
V (β˜T+k,
¯
BS , BA) > V (β˜
T ,
¯
BS , BA)
since the sovereign chooses T + k at (
¯
BS , BA). But then this inequality in combination
with the one in A.5, implies,
V (β˜T+k, B¯S , BA) > V (β˜
T , B¯S , BA)
which is a contradiction. So the duration of the program is weakly increasing in maturing
debt.
Appendix B
Capital requirements and bailouts
Top 25 Bank Holding Companies (methodology 1)
Citigroup Bank of Amer CORP
JPMorgan Chase & CO Wells Fargo & CO
U S BC Suntrust BK
Keycorp (KEY) Fifth Third BC
PNC FNCL SVC GROUP Comerica
BB&T CORP Unionbancal CORP
Citizens FNCL GROUP State Street CORP
Huntington BSHRS M&T BK CORP
Northern TR CORP (NTRS) Harris FC
Zions BC (ZION) Popular
Compass BSHRS Bancwest CORP (BWE)
First Horizon NAT CORP Synovus FC
Commerce BSHRS (CBSH)
Note: Acronyms used in figure 7 in parenthesis
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Top 25 Bank Holding Companies (methodology 2)
American Express (AMEX) American International Group (AIG)
Bank of America Bank of New York
Bear Stearns (BSC) Capital One (CAP ONE)
City Fifth Third BANCORP
Fannie Mae (MAE) Freddy Mac (MAC)
Goldman Sachs JP Morgan
Key Banks Lehman Brothers (LB)
Merrill Lynch Morgan Stanley
PNC Financial Services Regions Financial CORP
Suntrust Banks State Street Boston CORP
US BANCORP (USBANC) Wachovia CORP
Washington Mutual (WASH) Wells Fargo
Branch Banking and Trust
Note: Acronyms used in figure 8 in parenthesis
